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Abstract 
 In 2016 81% of self-identified white evangelical Christians voted for Donald Trump in 
the Presidential election and continued to support him after (Smith & Martinez, 2016; Peters & 
Dias, 2018). White evangelicals were willing to back a Republican candidate that appeared to 
deviate from their normal expectations of morality. The relationship between the Republican 
Party and white evangelical Christians has existed since the election of Ronald Reagan. This 
project examines the political history of white evangelicals in the United States. It analyzes 
recent data to compare the differences between white evangelicals and the general population 
and analyzes reports on white evangelicals during and after the 2016 election. This information 
is used to establish long-term historical trends that show why white evangelicals showed strong 
support both during and after the 2016 election within the broader historical context of white 
evangelicals’ relationship with politics.  
The results show that white evangelicals support for Trump is due to his alignment with 
their core political issues. Evangelicals as a political force are reactionary and established 
themselves in opposition to progressive change in the United States. Their core issues during 
their emergence have remained mostly consistent, and they have developed new core values in 
response to the United States’ changing political landscape. Donald Trump’s policies and 
rhetoric match the white evangelical position on all their primary issues. In combination with 
this, evangelicals now care less about the personal morality of candidates than any other group 
which shows a change in how they view candidates. White evangelicals feel as though Donald 
Trump is on their side and since immoral personal conduct is no longer an issue, his behavior 
does not pose a significant obstacle to white evangelical support. In summation white 
evangelicals like other voters, support candidates who will address their issues of concern which 
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is why they supported Donald Trump during the 2016 election and continued to support him 
afterward. 
   The results of this thesis confirm the findings of the majority of the scholarship on white 
evangelicals and Trump. Other research consistently concludes that white evangelicals support 
Trump because he is able to effectively address their fears about the direction that the United 
States is going and enacts regressive policies which suit their reactionary political agenda. Where 
the results diverge from previous work is on the matter of how to court evangelicals using 
religious rhetoric. Previous research has concluded that using religious rhetoric has been a 
necessary part of wooing the white evangelical voting bloc. This thesis shows that this rhetoric is 
no longer a requirement to gain white evangelical support. Today white evangelicals are more 
interested in enacting their values through policies than through a “Godly candidate”. Finally, 
this thesis goes beyond existing scholarship by placing the events of the 2016 election with the 
broader history of white evangelicals as reactionaries in American politics. It establishes that 
white evangelicals did not change radically as a group to accommodate Donald Trump. Their 
positions now are due to long term changes within the group and Trump’s populist policies 
addressing their long-term concerns. There is no evidence to suggest that their support will 
decline as he continues to accommodate their needs and further solidifies their ties to the 
Republican Party which is actively changing to support the president. 
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Introduction 
 Most historians agree that four key elements define evangelical Protestants: Biblicism, 
crucicentrism, conversionism, and activism (Hankins, 2008, p. 1). Biblicism means that the word 
of the Bible is the highest authority for religious matters (Hankins, 2008, pp. 1-2). Crucicentrism 
is a focus on Christ’s crucifixion believing that “Jesus’s crucifixion was a sacrifice for the sins of 
humankind followed by Christ’s literal and bodily resurrection without which there is no hope 
for the salvation of humans” (Hankins, 2008, p. 2). Conversionism covers the “born again” 
aspect of evangelicalism. It asserts that conversion is a single “life-transforming event” where a 
person finds God and becomes a Christian (Hankins, 2008, p. 2). The final element of 
evangelical Protestantism can be connected to politics. Activism is a central part of being an 
evangelical. It can take many forms such as “preaching, witnessing, and missionary work” as 
well as “other forms of cultural engagement including moral and political reform” (Hankins, 
2008, p. 2). If all these elements are present, a person can be identified as an evangelical. This 
definition covers all evangelical Protestants; however, this thesis will be exploring the actions of 
only white evangelicals. Given the racial segregation that has plagued the United States since its 
inception white evangelicals have developed as a distinct bloc that is shaped as much by its 
ethnic identity as its religious one.  
 Due to the complexity of historians’ definition, it is not used for data analysis regarding 
white evangelicals. There is no universal definition of evangelicals that all data collection 
organizations abide by and different sources will define the term differently. Due to this, data on 
evangelicals may vary depending on the source. In addition to these, different data sources 
survey different people. PRRI’s “2016 American Values Atlas” used a “sample of more than 
101,000 Americans from all 50 states” (Jones, 2017). In this survey “evangelicals” are defined as 
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those who self-identify as Protestant Christians who also identify as evangelical or born again” 
(Jones, 2017).  
On the other hand, Barna Group defined evangelicals by characteristics in the survey 
rather than allow them to self-identify (Barna, 2016). People were determined to be evangelicals 
if they met nine criteria. These included a personal commitment to Jesus Christ that is still 
important in their life today,” and that their faith is very important in their life today (Barna, 
2016). They also believe that when they die, they will go to Heaven because they have confessed 
their sins and accepted Jesus Christ as their Savior (Barna, 2016). They strongly believe they 
have a personal responsibility to share their religious beliefs about Christ with non-Christians, 
firmly believe that Satan exists, and strongly believe that eternal salvation is possible only 
through grace, not works (Barna, 2016). Additionally, they strongly agree that Jesus Christ lived 
a sinless life on earth, strongly assert that the Bible is accurate in all the principles it teaches, and 
describing God as the all-knowing, all-powerful, perfect deity who created the universe and still 
rules it today” (Barna, 2016). Smietana defines evangelicals in yet another way for Lifeway. 
“The representative online survey asked 1,000 Americans four questions about core evangelical 
beliefs on the Bible, the crucifixion of Jesus, salvation, and evangelism. Those who strongly 
agreed with all four (17 percent) qualified as having evangelical beliefs” (Smietana, 2016). 
These differences may affect who each survey identifies as evangelical and the total sample size. 
This thesis used self-reporting to define white evangelicals. Respondents to the analyzed surveys 
who identified themselves as white, Protestant, and would “describe [themselves] as a 'born-
again' or evangelical Christian” were counted. 
 White evangelicals are often confused with fundamentalist Christians. While there is 
overlap between the two groups, not all evangelicals are fundamentalists. Fundamentalist is an 
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ever-evolving term which is at the center of scholarly debate and can have political, religious, or 
cultural implications (Denemark, 2004, p. 143). Here fundamentalist refers to fundamentalist 
Christians within the United States. In historical context, fundamentalists were primarily 
Northern Protestants who rejected theological liberalism in favor of literalist interpretation of the 
Bible (Bendroth, 2017). The rejection of theological liberalism is also a defining feature of early 
evangelicals, but being an evangelical was not a prerequisite since many Protestant 
denominations were also fundamentalists. In the modern context fundamentalist support, extreme 
adherence to religious doctrine; however interpretations of what this means may vary so an exact 
set of values cannot be established (Bendroth, 2017). It is important to note that not all 
fundamentalists are evangelicals and despite an apparent adherence to the bible many 
evangelicals do not consider themselves fundamentalists. 
White evangelicals have always been a vocal group in American politics. White 
evangelical leaders often voice support for candidates and causes they believe represent their 
religious interests. White evangelicals played an important part in the 2016 election, voting 
overwhelmingly for Donald Trump. It was expected that white evangelicals would vote for the 
Republican nominee, but Donald Trump was different from a typical conservative nominee. 
White evangelical leaders usually focus on morality, but Trump was a candidate who was a 
divorcee, an adulterer, used vulgar language, and bragged about extramarital sex. From the white 
evangelical perspective, Donald Trump would be considered immoral. Despite this, more white 
evangelicals voted for Trump than any of the previous four Republican candidates (Smith & 
Martinez, 2016).  
Additionally, it is clear that this support was not a begrudging acceptance of the nominee 
since white evangelicals have been a core part of Trump’s base following the election. During 
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the 2018 midterm elections, white evangelicals were more supportive of Republicans than they 
had been before the election of Donald Trump (The Economist, 2019). They were also almost 
40% more likely to be supportive of the Republican administration than Protestants and over 
50% more likely than Catholics according to The Economist (The Economist, 2019). This data 
indicates that not only did evangelical support continue after his election, but it has also 
remained high throughout the first half of his presidency. It also shows that white evangelicals 
make up the religious core of Trump’s base since they are more likely to support him than any 
other religious group.  
This project is significant because it explores the recent decisions of white evangelicals in 
the U.S. as part of a larger historical trend among white evangelicals. A lot of research has been 
done on white evangelicals’ relationship to politics and more specifically the Republican Party in 
the past, but the 2016 election and Donald Trump’s candidacy violated both Republican and 
political norms. The 2016 election showed both a continuation of white evangelicals’ strong 
connection to the Republican Party along with a dramatic shift in what values they considered 
necessary in a candidate. This thesis will explain how what went on during and following the 
2016 election fits into historical-social patterns for white evangelicals. This research is relatively 
new because the 2016 election only happened recently and will contribute to a growing body of 
work that examines white evangelicals’ relationship with Trump. Donald Trump’s candidacy 
does not follow earlier Republican models, and it is necessary to examine further how it fits in 
with the longstanding relationship between white evangelicals and the Republican Party, 
especially if it has changed the dynamic in some way. This thesis will not examine the 2016 
election as an isolated incident but will explore it as part of a larger historical trend to fully 
explain how white evangelicals have come to this point. 
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Previous Work 
           In order to understand the choices white evangelicals made during the 2016 election and 
its aftermath, it is helpful to examine their attitudes towards the Republican Party and politicians 
at various points in American history. There is a large body of work that looks at the presence of 
evangelicals in American politics. White evangelicals played an important role in the 2016 
election, but their relationship with the Republican Party did not begin in 2016. It is necessary to 
understand the historical relationship between white evangelicals and the Republican Party in 
order to understand the 2016 election of Donald Trump. Religion has always been a part of 
American politics; however, the close relationship between Republicans and the evangelical right 
was established with the election of Ronald Reagan. The evangelical right or Christian Right 
emerged during his election in 1980 (Hankins, 2008, pp. 38-43). The growth of white 
evangelicals as an important constituency of the Republican Party occurred at this time because 
of social change such as sex education that had mobilized evangelicals followed by elections of 
key conservatives (Hankins, 2008, pp. 140-143). Jerry Falwell, a prominent evangelical leader at 
the time, emphasized sexual sins and moral failing and held similar ideas to Reagan about an 
idealized Christian America which helped to connect white evangelicals with the president and 
his party (Gorski, 2017a, pp. 196-198). According to a study done by Kevin Coe, Reagan was 
favored by evangelicals because his views aligned with theirs on social issues such as abortion 
and school prayer as well as providing a strong military which was necessary to Christianize 
communist states according to evangelicals (Coe, 2006, pp. 309-330). The development of the 
evangelical right in conjunction with the rise of conservative politicians that met their demands 
cemented the relationship between evangelicals and Republicans under Reagan. These issues 
were particularly important to religious Americans at this time. Research shows that from 1976 
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onward, many Americans felt the need to reaffirm their country’s morality. The increased focus 
on morality made elected officials’ religion a priority for voters (Ribuffo, 2006, pp. 19-20). It 
also made the rise of communism a major concern because communism threatened America’s 
religious values with its competing secular ideology (Ribuffo, 2006, pp. 19-20).  
Further research supports the idea that the Republican Party developed a relationship with 
evangelicals due to the creation of the Christian Right at this time and adds that the relationship 
was further strengthened as prominent evangelical figures were brought into the administrations 
they supported (FitzGerald, 2017, p.360). The Christian Right is a social movement that emerged 
as an oppositional force to progressive movements within the United States during the 1970s. 
The movement was made up of smaller conservative religious groups the most influential of 
which were headed by white evangelical leaders (Gorski, 2017a, pp. 193-195; Hankins, 2008, p. 
149). The most talked about groups were Jerry Falwell’s Moral Majority and later Pat 
Robertson’s Christian Coalition (Hankins, 2008, p. 149). While the Christian Right was not 
exclusively made up of white evangelicals, they were a core part of the movement, and their 
leaders had a significant role in directing the goals of the movement (Gorski, 2017a, pp. 193-
195). Since the Christian Right was made up of white evangelical groups, its historical goals 
align closely with the political interests of a majority of white evangelicals. The name of the 
movement was even changed due to evangelical influence. It was formerly known as the new 
religious right, but was changed to match Pat Robertson’s group “because his organization had 
the word “Christian” in the title, the name for the entire movement changed from New Religious 
Right to Christian Right, which remains to this day the most popular term” (Hankins, 2008, p. 
149).  
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 Further research suggests in 1980 that issues of morality became more central to 
evangelicals as they were disappointed by Jimmy Carter’s lack of opposition to abortion, gay 
rights and civil rights (Harley, 1980). Additionally, during the election of 1980 highly religious 
evangelicals did not vote based on the usual predictors and were more likely to be conservative 
and vote for Reagan (Brudney, 1984, pp. 1072-1079). The change in voting habits can be 
connected to the other research that found that moral traditionalism among evangelicals was 
successfully able to explain evangelical agreement with political conservatives on a large number 
of issues (Brint, 2010, pp. 328-350).  
 Additional sources show how this growth has continued over time and that the 
connection between the two groups still exists today. Even among younger generations of 
evangelicals, high religiosity is strongly related to Republican Party identification (Pelz, 2015).  
Additionally, evangelicals outside of the south have become more Republican over time, 
showing the continuing formation of a bond between the groups (Kiecolt & Nelsen, 1991, pp. 
552-569). In addition to the growth of the evangelical right there was also no evangelical 
alternative on the left due to internal fracturing. In 1970 research shows the attempt to build a 
left-wing evangelical movement failed because of fragmenting along other identity lines, with 
different groups prioritizing the advancement of their own race or gender while ignoring the need 
for intersectional cooperation (Swartz, 2011, pp. 81-120).  As a result, the Left was never able to 
compete with the power of the Right which was able to unify under key conservative issues 
(Swartz, 2011, pp. 81-120).   
  While many white evangelicals tend to be conservative, not all research depicts them as a 
unified group. Evangelicals in America present a broad spectrum both on opinions of how much 
they should be involved in politics and what role religion should play in politics (Smith, 2002). 
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Despite this, the other data still established a link to the Republican Party and research on the 
diversity of evangelicals does not refute this but instead establishes a plurality which is necessary 
to note to avoid over generalization. 
 Evangelicals are important in American politics not only because of how they react to 
presidential candidates but also because of how candidates respond to them. The literature on the 
subject indicates that Republican candidates are aware of evangelicals as an essential voting bloc 
and actively court their vote. A former aide accused George W. Bush of manipulating 
evangelicals to retain their vote (Kuo, 2006). Additionally, research suggests that Bush actively 
cultivated a conservative Christian base to support him, increasing the presence of evangelicals 
in politics (Gilgoff, 2007, pp. 33-35). Low evangelical turnout for Bush in 2000 led him to make 
the evangelical vote a priority of his 2004 campaign (Gilgoff, 2007, pp. 33-35).  Further research 
found that presidents purposefully used religious rhetoric and that Ronald Reagan and George 
W. Bush’s rhetoric was tailored to gain evangelical support (Coe, 2006, pp.309-330). 
 Like all voting blocs, evangelicals choose candidates that will give them what they want. 
The key feature of white evangelicals is their religious values. White evangelicals were 
historically concerned with issues tied to their religiously based morality. Candidates have also 
emphasized their own religiosity to gain evangelical approval (Coe, 2006, pp. 309-325; Hamby, 
2008; Carnes, 2008; Luo, 2007).  One would assume based on their previous voting patterns that 
evangelicals would vote based on the religious morality in 2016; however, research suggests this 
is not the case. Trump has little understanding of the religious rhetoric and Biblical literacy used 
by previous Republican presidential candidates (Boston, 2015, pp. 38-39). Therefore, their 
support for Trump must be based on something besides personal morality. 
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The research in this thesis will show that white evangelicals support Donald Trump 
because his policies support their goals on key issues, and he provides a solution to their anxiety 
about the changes facing America. Additionally, personal immorality has become a lower 
priority for white evangelicals in recent years, and this shift contributes to their embrace of 
Trump. White evangelicals support for Trump will be placed within the broader context of white 
evangelicals’ political history and their resulting relationship with the Republican Party. This 
thesis will analyze previous research to illustrate white evangelicals’ growth as a political force 
which is deeply connected to the Republican Party in the United States. White evangelicals’ 
historical growth provides context for the political landscape of the 2016 election and a baseline 
for change within the group. Previous research will also be used to determine the core concerns 
of the group and how Donald Trump diverges from traditional Republicans. Existing analysis of 
survey data will be used to show statistically what was happening within the white evangelical 
group prior, during, and after the 2016 election. Shifting opinions and demographics among 
white evangelicals along with their history of racial insecurity are necessary to understand the 
vulnerable position white evangelicals were in when they decided to vote for Trump. Data from 
both the Public Religion Research Institute and The Pew Research Institute from recent years is 
used to independently establish support for trends among white evangelicals that contribute to 
their embrace of Donald Trump. This data also shows their continued support which suggests 
that Donald Trump continues to alleviate their status anxiety by addressing their core issues 
during his presidency. 
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Evangelicals Historical Development in America 
Foundation of Evangelicalism in American Protestantism  
Evangelicals developed from white American Protestantism. They began to emerge as an 
influential group within American Protestantism during the revivals which occurred consistently 
from the 1740’s onward (Hankins, 2008, p. 12). Revivals involved sermons where charismatic 
preachers drew large crowds, sometimes in the tens of thousands, to hear them speak (Hankins, 
2008, pp. 9-15). Revivals could be held in any space, as the only requirements were a speaker 
and an audience, which allowed them to be mobile. This mobility combined with the work of 
preachers such as Charles Grandison Finney who moved revivals into urban areas allowed the 
active spread of “revivalist evangelicalism” until it was a mainstay of American religious culture 
(Hankins, 2008, pp. 11-14). These revivals were the beginning of American evangelicalism, and 
they created a consciousness in American Christianity that would later affect their forays into the 
political sphere. Hankins concludes that revivals led to the “democratization of American 
Christianity (Hankins, 2008, p. 16). Since revivals targeted all types of people, and who spoke 
was primarily determined by popularity, Christians felt empowered within their churches 
(Hankins, 2008, p. 16). As a result, they turned to them rather than institutions like the 
government where they had less control (Hankins, 2008, p. 16). The feeling of empowerment 
through religion remained relevant as evangelicals began engaging with the government through 
religious groups rather than as individual citizens. 
 
Theological conflict and the separation of Evangelical Protestantism  
After the revivals of the First and Second Great Awakenings, evangelicals still hadn’t 
fully developed their political consciousness. Evangelicals emerged as a mostly conservative 
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group after a series of scholarly debates within Protestant Christianity in the United States had 
played out. Conflict arose as different Christian groups in the United States adopted or rejected 
the new ideas of Theological Modernism (Hankins, 2008, p. 19). Theological Modernism is a 
progressive lens of Biblical interpretation that looks at religion using new ways of thinking and 
believes the Bible can be interpreted as a metaphor or that language in the Bible may not be 
literal (Hankins, 2008, pp. 19-23). Evangelicals rejected this new scheme of interpretation. They 
separated themselves from this new wave of Protestants by reaffirming their belief in a literal 
reading of scripture which became a defining feature (Hankins, 2008, pp. 19-45; Grover, 2013, 
pp. 26-30). This split cemented the majority of American evangelicals as a conservative religious 
group that rejected modernism in favor of a fundamentalist reading of the Bible. The 
fundamentalist beliefs that became a core part of the evangelical identity at this time would 
affect what issues of morality they deemed important later on as their main areas of concern in 
politics aligned with issues relevant to their religion. 
 
The New Christian Right 
Early Growth 
At this point evangelicals while demonstrating a more conservative interpretation of the 
Bible had yet to enter American politics fully. They were not yet tied to the Republican Party. In 
fact, evangelicals were actively opposed to engaging with politics. In the 1960s Jerry Falwell 
declared in a sermon that “he would never get involved in politics because his call was to preach 
the gospel” (Hankins, 2008, p. 139). Despite this statement, Falwell would get involved in 
politics and in doing so would help shape the relationships between white evangelicals and the 
American political system as a key member of the American New Christian Right (Hankins, 
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2008, pp. 139-145; Gorski, 2017a, pp. 194-196). This new movement began during the 1960s in 
response to the controversy surrounding the government funding of sex education in schools 
while also removing school prayer around the same time (Hankins, 2008, pp. 140-148). 
Evangelicals perceived this as an attack against morality; however, they did not fully mobilize 
until later in the 20th century (Hankins, 2008, pp. 141-156; Gorski, 2017a, pp. 154-156; Dudley, 
2014). Despite this, evangelicals learned about mobilization during these controversies and “that 
by marshaling their arguments, organizing their forces, and stomping on the hottest buttons, they 
could exert influence out of all proportion to their numbers or the true popularity of their 
positions” (Martin, 1996 as cited in Hankins, 2008, p. 141). The New Christian Right started to 
successfully impose its influence in the late 1970s and early 1980s around the time of Ronald 
Reagan’s first election, however, it was the election of Jimmy Carter that first drew more 
evangelicals into politics (Gorski, 2017a, pp. 196-198; Hankins, 2008, pp. 142-143). Jimmy 
Carter was open about his status as an evangelical which excited the group, but they became 
disappointed at his failure to install the conservative policies they favored (Hankins, 2008, p. 
143). It was this disappointment, and a perceived government mandated secularization which led 
the prominent evangelical leader Francis Schaeffer to attempt to push other evangelicals into 
politics to fight a cultural war against it (Hankins, 2008, p. 145). While Schaffer did not witness 
the ultimate culmination of the movement, he left his mark through his publications and his 
student Jerry Falwell (Hankins, 2008, p. 145). 
 
Changes Under Falwell 
Jerry Falwell was not the only leader in the New Christian Right; however, he was hugely 
influential, and major changes were made to the movement under his leadership (Gorski, 2017a, 
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pp. 193-196; Hankins, 2008, pp. 144-146). Falwell influenced the New Christian Right through 
his own organization known as “The Moral Majority” (Hankins, 2008, p. 147). Under Falwell, 
there were six significant changes which defined the new movement. 
The first change was Falwell focused exclusively on sexual sins while ignoring or 
dismissing sins that were more present in the national structure of America such as greed 
(Gorski, 2017a, p. 180). He was also more likely to cite previous conservative Christian leaders 
than the scripture itself (Gorski, 2017a, p. 180). These leaders were part of what came to be 
known as the Old Christian Right which was more openly fundamentalist and had previously 
been considered a radical conservative fringe group in mainstream society. Falwell’s actions 
indicate that the New Christian Right was creating a narrative of moral absolutism that used the 
Bible for its purposes but had a focus on the conservative ideals they wanted to present over an 
actual interpretation of scripture. In addition to this, Falwell did not focus his attention on 
encouraging fundamentalists like himself. He put all responsibility for the Nation’s failings on 
those who were not already converted to his cause, the secularists (Gorski, 2017a, p. 180). The 
New Christian Right was establishing a conflict, with themselves on the side of morality in 
opposition to an outside corrupting influence. 
Another major change of the New Christian Right under Falwell was support for 
constitutional fundamentalism. Constitutional fundamentalism is not unique to evangelicals or 
the Christian Right. It is a position that is also held by many American conservatives including 
the late Supreme Court judge Antonin Scalia (Kettle, 2016). Constitutional fundamentalism is 
another way of describing constitutional originalism, which can be defined as “the idea that we 
should follow the original intent of the Founding Fathers in interpreting the Constitution” 
(Snyder, 2015). This means that the constitution is viewed as an objective, unchanging document 
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that can only be interpreted in the immediate historical context of when it was written 
(Calabresi). Under Falwell, the New Christian Right adopted this stance, but with the added 
caveat that the Constitution was divinely inspired in its original form and therefore could not be 
altered (Gorski, 2017a, p. 181). The adoption of these views about the constitution is significant 
to the movement’s relationships with politicians. They were more likely to support constitutional 
originalists, a group that often intersects with conservative Republicans. Falwell also rejected 
earlier Christian ideas about spiritual discovery and committed to a set of unalterable 
fundamentalist principles which halted all ideas of religious reformation and progress (Gorski, 
2017a, p. 181). This change is a reflection of Falwell’s own fundamentalist ideals and explains 
why the core values of conservative evangelicals remain similar to what they were in the ‘80s 
(Hankins, 2008, pp. 147-149). Falwell’s organization, the Moral Majority, was only the most 
influential group in the Christian Right until the mid-’80s however Falwell’s early involvement 
shaped the core values of the movement which continue to today (Hankins, 2008, p. 149). The 
movement had not significantly adapted any of its spiritual ideals. The final change that occurred 
under Falwell was that he presented individuals who opposed him as being unredeemable and as 
servants of the devil (Gorski, 2017a, p. 181). Falwell’s black and white interpretation of morality 
illustrates how the movement saw itself as the only moral option, and that compromise with its 
opposition was ethically unacceptable. These changes are what separated the New Christian 
Right, which emerged in the 1970s, from earlier Right-wing religious movements. Their belief in 
the complete moral decline of America along with the development of a strong oppositional 
sense of identity is likely what drove them into politics. 
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The New Christian Right and Reagan 
The emergence of the New American Christian Right cannot fully explain evangelical 
political power by itself. The rise of certain Republican leaders at this point and their reactions to 
this new movement are what gave evangelicals power through the Republican Party. An 
influential Republican in the development of evangelicals in politics was President Ronald 
Reagan. He used “God talk”, rhetoric that refers to a divine being, more than any other preceding 
president and there was a significant increase in this type of talk under Reagan compared to 
previous presidencies (Coe, 2006, pp. 317-325). He even went so far as to adopt the rhetoric of 
the Christian Right in his speeches (Fitzgerald, 2017, p.253).  His choice to use religious rhetoric 
indicates that he represented a change in the way presidents and presidential candidates 
referenced and related to religion in America. Reagan developed close relationships with leaders 
of the Christian Right, specifically Jerry Falwell. Falwell supported Reagan’s economic plan and 
actively endorsed the presidency as being one that represented his values (FitzGerald, 2017, p. 
252). Eventually “Reagan’s liaison to conservative religious groups estimated that he had more 
contact with the president than any other religious leader” (FitzGerald, 2017, p. 252). 
Reagan was attractive to the Christian Right for several reasons. His inclusion of God in 
his politics endeared him to the New Christian Right movement. He also aligned with the New 
Christian Right on several of their core issues. Reagan was anti-abortion and supported prayer in 
schools which were two major issues for the New Christian Right (Coe, 2006, p. 312; Jefries, 
2017, pp. 196-197). Reagan as a candidate also appealed to religious individuals wanting to 
reaffirm America’s national morality (Ribuffo, 2006, pp. 19-20). He also had a similar view of 
morality to Jerry Falwell and accepted that groups he opposed such as liberals and homosexuals 
were inherently evil (Gorski, 2017a, p. 198). Reagan was the ideal candidate for the emerging 
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evangelical Right. The relationship that began with his election would continue through his 
presidency. Additionally, this relationship between presidents like Reagan and evangelicals was 
strengthened as evangelicals were brought into presidential administrations (Fitzgerald, 2017, pp. 
251-253). The presence of people who were part of evangelical movements in positions of power 
and influence increased the political power of evangelicals in politics as a whole. 
 
A Continuing Relationship 
The relationship between evangelicals and Republican presidential candidates continues 
after Reagan. “God talk” continued to be higher following Reagan’s presidency reaching its 
highest point under George W. Bush (Coe, 2006, pp. 317-325). Following Reagan, there was a 
continuing trend of religious importance in politics. George W. Bush had the most “God talk” of 
any president up to that point (Coe, 2006, pp. 317-325). Like both Reagan and Falwell, Bush 
made clear distinctions between good and evil with himself and America on the clear side of 
good fighting against evil groups that lacked nuance (Gorski, 2017a, pp. 202-203).  
Bush sought out the evangelical vote more actively than Reagan. According to former 
Bush aide David Kuo’s book Tempting Faith: An Inside Story of Political Seduction, George W. 
Bush pandered to evangelical voters in order to manipulate them into voting for him (Kuo, 
2006). The evangelical Right had become a powerful voting bloc by this point, and Republican 
presidents felt the need to ensure the continuation of a strong relationship with them. Bush 
recognized low evangelical turnout in the 2000 presidential election was bad for him which led 
him to pursue the evangelical vote as a priority in 2004 in order to reaffirm the existing 
relationship with the reliable bloc (Gilgoff, 2007). As a result of his “I Vote Values” campaign 
“Some estimate that 7 to 9 million new evangelical voters attended the polls in the election, 
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presumably to vote for Bush” (Hankins, 2008, p. 156). Republican presidents have come to 
understand that evangelical support is necessary for them to win. Evangelicals have likewise 
realized that Republicans will support their God-based platform, so they have consistently sided 
with them since the election of Ronald Reagan.  
By looking at the development of evangelicals, it is clear that evangelicals tend to be 
conservative. However, not all evangelicals are conservative. In the early 1970s, before the New 
Christian Right gained its power, there was an attempt by left-wing evangelicals to construct 
their own movement (Swartz, 2011, pp. 81-120). This attempt began in the 1960s when a 
significant amount of young well-educated evangelicals began to pull away from older 
generations conservatism (Wuthow, 1988, pp. 185-192). Unfortunately for liberal evangelicals, 
this shift caused many conservative evangelicals to split off from their established churches to 
form new ones leading to an ultra-conservative trend among some evangelicals that grew at the 
same time as the liberal one (Wuthow, 1988, pp. 185-192). As has been discussed conservative 
evangelicals formed the base of the Christian Right in response to America’s growing liberalism. 
The left-wing movement that mirrored this had a chance in the 1970s to present an evangelical 
opposition to the New Christian Right, however, the project ultimately failed. The evangelical 
left was unable to present a unified front based around a core set of issues like the right. 
According to David Swartz in his article “Identity Politics and the Fragmenting of the 1970s 
Evangelical Left,” the movement fell apart because of identity-based political divisions (Swartz, 
2011, p.83). These divisions developed around gender, race, and theological perspectives that 
could not be resolved causing the movement to break apart into smaller groups that served 
individual demographics (Swartz, 2011, p.83). Since the evangelical left failed to develop there 
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was no oppositional group within the evangelical community to compete with the Christian 
Right for influence.  
In contrast with the fragmentary left, the Christian Right was very good at uniting 
different Christian groups under a single cause. Falwell was especially adept at this. His rhetoric 
joined together fundamentalists and evangelicals as well as uniting Christians with differing 
levels of militancy behind moral reform (Harding, 2000, p. 164). Rather than fragmenting like 
the left Falwell actively excluded diversity from his movement making it a white movement 
which condemned other religions and those with more liberal tendencies (Harding, 2000, p. 166). 
As a result, the movement was not subject to the same type of splintering because it was 
relatively homogeneous in terms of race and conservative status.  Despite having different 
churches and conservative groups within the evangelical Right, they were able to present 
coherent conservative goals in their political platform. The lack of a stable opposition among 
evangelicals in conjunction with the Republican Party’s active courting of the evangelical vote 
contributed to the creation of a stable evangelical voting bloc for Republicans. 
In politics, evangelicals are usually represented by conservative leaders and groups as 
part of the New Christian Right. However, it is important to note that the goals and beliefs of 
these groups are not representative of all evangelicals in America. While evangelicals hold a 
broad array of opinions on different issues, an especially important issue is their role in politics 
(Smith, 2000, pp. 92-128). According to Smith, there are different positions on how involved 
evangelicals should be in politics ranging from evangelicals who believe Christians should not 
engage in politics to those who believe that Christian should “impose their standards on the 
country (Smith, 2000, pp. 94-99). Smith notes that the majority of evangelicals fall in neither of 
these categories. The majority of evangelicals view participation in politics as a normal aspect of 
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life in America and that Christians have as much right as anyone else to be a part of it (Smith, 
2000, p. 98). This shows that the majority of evangelicals are not intent on imposing their moral 
order on America, but they do want to engage in political discourse. However, despite this 
diversity, there is still a link between white evangelicals and conservatives. In his book American 
Evangelicals: A contemporary history of a mainstream religious movement Barry Hankins 
writes,  
Evangelicals and fundamentalists are highly visible during political campaigns, especially 
presidential races every four years. A key question for every would-be Republican 
presidential candidate is how well he or she will appeal to evangelical voters … Because 
evangelicals have become the most reliable and influential voting bloc in the Republican 
Party (Hankins, 2008, p. 1).    
It is well established that evangelicals are important to the Republican Party and their votes are 
highly sought after despite the diversity of white evangelical perspective. As Hankins points out, 
they are a visible bloc during campaigns. Their visibility shows that they are an active political 
force in the United States that holds influence over one of America’s two political parties. 
 
Trump Compared to Other Republican Candidates 
If Trump were the standard Republican candidate, there would be no confusion over why 
white evangelicals supported him. However, Trump appears to deviate significantly from other 
Republicans both with his own approach to religion and in the way evangelicals react to him. 
Despite their overall support for past Republican candidates, white evangelicals have criticized 
other candidates for what they considered to be moral failings. Additionally, the way Trump 
talked about religion and courted religious voters was far from the “god talk” demonstrated by 
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Ronald Reagan and George W. Bush (Coe, 2006, pp. 309-325). The most relevant comparisons 
to Trump in terms of Republican candidates are John McCain and Mitt Romney as they are the 
most recent Republican candidates. Both McCain and Romney appealed to evangelicals using 
religious rhetoric but also were viewed with skepticism because of their faith. Donald Trump 
does not appeal to evangelicals in the same way, but he has also been less critical of far-right 
evangelical leaders than previous candidates. His lack of criticism may explain his preferential 
treatment.  
 
McCain 
 John McCain ran as the Republican candidate in the 2008 election. In this election, he 
won 74% of the white evangelical vote (Smith, 2017). Additionally, during this election, McCain 
actively courted the evangelicals vote.  Despite this McCain was not on the best terms with white 
evangelicals going into the election and white evangelicals were wary of his campaign at first 
(Luo, 2008; Hagerty, 2008). During the Republican primaries for the 2000 election, McCain had 
a problematic relationship with white evangelical voters and lost the Republican nomination to 
George W. Bush (Luo, 2008; Hagerty, 2008). He rebuked attack ads for the Bush campaign 
many of which were funded by evangelical groups (Hagerty, 2008). McCain’s main problem 
with gaining evangelical support appeared to be his rejection of far-right evangelical leaders in 
his attempt to court moderates (Luo, 2008; Hagerty, 2008). During the 2000 election, John 
McCain referred to Pat Robertson or Jerry Falwell as “agents of intolerance” which did not play 
well with evangelical voters (Luo, 2008; Hagerty, 2008). Additionally, McCain was endorsed by 
Rev. John Hagee and the Rev. Rod Parsley who were both prominent evangelicals but rejected 
their support because of Islamophobic and antisemitic remarks the preachers had made (Luo, 
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2008; Hagerty, 2008). Needless to say, that John McCain was not the most popular Republican 
among white evangelicals going into the 2008 election. 
 Still in 2008 McCain more actively pursued the evangelical vote and was successful in 
gaining a majority among white evangelicals. One of his appeals to religious voters involved his 
own use of faith-based rhetoric and personal religion (Hamby, 2008; Carnes, 2008). John 
McCain’s use of faith changed dramatically over the course of the election as it became clear this 
was a way to tap into the religious voting bloc he had lost previously lost (Hamby, 2008). Early 
in the campaign McCain talked about the importance of God to him but explained that he felt his 
relationship with God was a private matter (Hamby, 2008). By the end of the campaign “the 
GOP nominee-in-waiting sat onstage with mega-pastor Rick Warren at his Saddleback Church in 
California, earning cheers for telling an audience of evangelicals that he was "saved and 
forgiven" (Hamby, 2008). McCain was able to reverse some of the earlier suspicions about him 
through his use of religious rhetoric. This is a pattern which holds true for Mitt Romney as well. 
 
Romney 
 White evangelicals also had a problem with Mitt Romney going into the 2012 election. 
The primary issue they had with Romney was his faith. Evangelicals appear to be highly 
suspicious of Mormons; some are even concerned that Mormonism is a cult rather than a religion 
(Chittum, 2012; Slater, 2012). Many evangelicals call Mormonism a “false religion” and “assert 
that Mormonism denies the divinity of Christ and is therefore not a branch of Christianity” 
(Reynolds, 2012). During the primaries, Romney’s faith was a larger issue for evangelicals than 
the immorality of other candidates (Reynolds, 2012). During the primaries in evangelical-heavy 
states such as South Carolina, “Newt Gingrich, a thrice-married Catholic won twice as much 
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support from evangelical Protestants as Mitt Romney, a Protestant” (Reynolds, 2012). This 
information shows that Trump is not the first amoral candidate that evangelicals have preferred 
and further illustrates how Romney’s relationship with religion alienated him with their voting 
bloc.  
 Despite his faith being the major point of contention for evangelicals, Romney like 
McCain used religion to win over evangelical voters. During the campaign, Romney “invoked 
the Rev. Rick Warren, a popular evangelical author, and megachurch pastor. He has quoted 
Scripture and alluded to the Gideon Bible as favorite late-night reading. And he has cited his 
belief in Jesus Christ as his personal “savior” (Luo, 2007). Evangelicals were still suspicious 
because Mormons understanding of the bible was different from their own (Luo, 2007). In order 
to combat evangelical suspicion in the general election, Romney chose to appeal to evangelicals 
by playing down his own faith in exchange for shared “Judeo-Christian values” which he hoped 
would endear him to religious conservatives (Burke, 2012).  
 
Trump vs. Cruz 
 It is also important to compare Trump to his fellow Republican primary candidates. The 
most relevant comparison is with Senator Ted Cruz. Both Cruz and Trump were popular with 
white evangelicals during the primary (Sargent, 2015). During the Iowa Republican Caucus Cruz 
and Trump were the top Republican candidates with 27.6% and 24.3% of the vote respectively 
(Andrews, 2016). The evangelical vote is necessary to win the state since it makes up a large 
proportion of Republican voters; in 2008 60% of the Republican Caucus vote were born again 
Christians or evangelicals, and 59% were in 2012 (Chinni, 2016). White evangelicals during the 
campaign were split between Trump and Cruz because of their similarities (Sargent, 2015). 
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While their approach to religion may be different Donald Trump was very similar to Cruz in 
policy. Both Cruz and Trump supported securing the border, Trump with a wall and Cruz with 
additional fencing and technology (Prignano, 2016). Both agreed that illegal immigrants should 
be deported and that Muslims presented a threat to national security, with Trump proposing his 
Muslim ban and Cruz suggesting patrolling in Muslim neighborhoods to prevent radicalization 
(Prignano, 2016). On the issue of Islamic extremism both also agreed that increased bombings 
were the correct way to deal with ISIS (Prignano, 2016). 
 They were both popular with evangelicals because their rhetoric tapped into evangelical 
concerns about declines in American value (Sargent, 2015). Where Trump and Cruz differ were 
on understanding policy and religious rhetoric. Trump was a political outsider with no 
experience while Cruz had experience making policy decisions (Rogers, 2016). Additionally, 
Cruz followed the pattern of earlier Republican candidates of using religious rhetoric as a way to 
appeal to conservative voters (Hamilton, 2016). Cruz actively linked God and American ethos in 
a speech. He said, “[F]or so many Americans, the promise of America seems more and more 
distant. What is the promise of America? The idea that—the revolutionary idea that this country 
was founded upon, which is that our rights don’t come from man. They come from God 
Almighty” (Hamilton, 2016). This statement reasserts the idea of America as a Christian nation 
and that American values are Christian values. As has been discussed this is a widespread 
sentiment among evangelicals. Ted Cruz made courting Christians a priority of his campaign. 
Cruz had campaign staff members whose sole purpose was outreach to religious leaders and 
attended a large number of faith events (Jervis, 2015). Aside from religious rhetoric and outreach 
Cruz also made the importance of religious liberty a key part of his message (Jervis, 2015). His 
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approach was popular among evangelicals, and he did well in evangelical-heavy states 
(Goldmacher, 2016). 
 
Trump 
 Trump and Cruz were very similar in policy ideas, however; Trump diverged from Cruz, 
Romney, and McCain when it came to religious rhetoric. Donald Trump’s relationship with 
Christianity shows a lack of understanding and low regard for its importance. After the Access 
Hollywood tape, Trump’s apology did not include God. He also has stated that he has never 
asked God for forgiveness which is out of line with common Christian conduct (Scott, 2015). 
According to CNN columnist Daniel Burke, Trump has “tried to put money in the Communion 
plate and referred to the sacrament as "my little wine" and "my little cracker." He mispronounced 
a book of the Bible, and when asked about his favorite verse, has either deferred or, in one case, 
cited "an eye for an eye," an Old Testament revenge scheme specifically condemned by Christ” 
(Burke, 2016).  
In contrast to the other candidates who make allusions to Biblical scripture, Trump is 
very vague in his religious rhetoric. When asked about his feelings about the Bible Trump said, 
“I think the Bible is certainly, it is the book,” (Moyer & Starrs, 2016). When asked if he had any 
favorite passages in the Bible Trump deflected saying he did not want to go into specifics and 
that it was very personal (Moyer & Starrs, 2016). When asked if he had a favorite Testament, he 
replied “Probably equal,” Trump said. “I think it’s just an incredible, the whole Bible is an 
incredible—” (Moyer & Starrs, 2016). In his most famous book “The Art of the Deal, he never 
invokes a personal relationship with Christ as part of the path to success (Moyer & Starrs, 2016). 
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These examples show that during the campaign Trump did not use the same type of religious 
rhetoric as other Republican candidates. 
 Trump not only broke the mold with his vague religious rhetoric he also called into 
question his opponents’ faith. In a meeting with prominent evangelicals, Trump said of Clinton 
“we don't know anything about Hillary in terms of religion” (Easley, 2016). He went on to say 
that people should not pray for all their leaders because “all of your leaders are selling 
Christianity down the tubes, selling the evangelicals down the tubes,” (Easley, 2016). He says 
this despite his own lack of disclosure about religion. Donald Trump has a pattern of questioning 
the religious legitimacy of those he opposes. Before his Campaign even began, he questioned 
whether then President Obama was secretly a Muslim (Moody, 2015). He continued to support 
this conspiracy during the campaign. At a town hall meeting, Trump did not correct a supporter 
who asserted the President was a Muslim (Moody, 2015). “We have a problem in this country. 
It's called Muslims,” a man attending Trump's rally in Rochester, New Hampshire, said. "You 
know our current president is one. You know he's not even an American." "We need this 
question," Trump said, chuckling. "This is the first question” (Moody, 2015). Trump’s campaign 
later tried to backtrack saying that he didn’t hear that part of the man’s statement (Moody, 2015). 
However, this was not the only time that Trump acknowledged this during the campaign. At a 
rally, Donald Trump called then President Barack Obama the “founder of Isis” and repeatedly 
stated that Isis was celebrating him and that Hillary Clinton was also responsible for Isis 
(Siddiqui, 2016). These types of attacks are out of character for Republican candidates. Neither 
McCain nor Romney questioned Barack Obama’s Christianity during the campaign. Romney did 
accuse Obama’s administration of assaulting religious freedom in America but did not question 
Obama’s own faith (Murray, 2012).  
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 Trump’s attacks on opponents’ religion were not limited to Democrats. He questioned 
both Mitt Romney’s and Ted Cruz’s religion. When talking about Cruz Trump asked, "How can 
Ted Cruz be an Evangelical Christian when he lies so much and is so dishonest?" (Hensch, 2016; 
Schlesinger, 2016). He also questioned whether Cruz could be evangelical because of his Cuban 
heritage because according to Trump “not too many evangelicals come out of Cuba” (Margolin, 
2016; Schlesinger, 2016). Trump also attacked Romney in front of a Salt Lake City crowd 
asking, “Are you sure he’s a Mormon?” and “Are we sure?” in reference to Romney (Margolin, 
2016). The attacks on his fellow party members further remove him from a typical Republican 
candidate. 
 
How is Trump Different? 
 Evangelicals have had some strong reservations about the previous two Republican 
presidential candidates, many of these reservations centered around their faith or lack thereof. 
Additionally, evangelicals responded positively to Ted Cruz’s religious rhetoric. Trump 
exhibited an even lower level of religiosity than McCain or Romney, attacked the faith of others 
including his fellow Republicans, and didn’t use religious rhetoric to appeal to evangelicals. So, 
it would make sense for white evangelicals to be highly critical of Trump. However, evangelicals 
did not react as expected when it came to Trump. It was not that there was no evangelical 
criticism of him, but what stands out was the leniency of their reactions compared to how severe 
his indiscretions were compared with previous candidates. Trump’s campaign was plagued with 
scandals. During the campaign a tape came to light where “Donald Trump bragged in vulgar 
terms about kissing, groping and trying to have sex with women during a 2005 conversation 
caught on a hot microphone” (Fahrenthold, 2016). In the tape, he specifically mentioned trying 
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to sleep with a married woman. White evangelicals normally condemn this type of behavior, but 
this was not the case with the Access Hollywood tape. After the Access Hollywood tape, the 
majority of evangelical leaders did not condemn Trump (Holland, 2016). Evangelical leaders 
were concerned with the comments, but that did not make them reject Trump as a candidate. 
“The president of the Southern Baptist Convention, said, “I don’t appreciate the comments and I 
don’t understand the comments, but at the same time, you’re going to find that most evangelicals 
... have to understand that people are going to say things that are not always right” (Caldwell, 
2016).  
Trump was also supported by some of the most influential evangelicals in the country. 
Franklin Graham, son of Billy Graham who was one of the most prominent white evangelicals in 
American history, was an early supporter of Donald Trump’s campaign (Griswold, 2018). 
Graham “leads a seven-hundred-and-sixty-five-million-dollar evangelical empire, which includes 
the Billy Graham Evangelistic Association, and also his international Christian relief effort, 
Samaritan’s Purse” so his influence among evangelicals cannot be understated (Griswold, 2018). 
Graham has made statements condemning Islam as an evil religion after 9/11 and his support of 
Trump early on was linked to Trump’s proposed Muslim ban (Griswold, 2018). This attitude is 
similar to the attitude toward Muslims of the evangelical leaders whose support McCain rejected 
during his run (Griswold, 2018). However, Trump unlike McCain, did not reject endorsements 
so while his overall attitude made evangelicals skeptical he did not alienate them further by 
rejecting their assistance. Graham was not the only prominent evangelical leader who sided with 
Trump. Trump’s promises must have appealed to evangelicals because once Trump took office, 
he has been praised for his actions. Jerry Falwell Jr. goes so far as to state “I think evangelicals 
have found their dream president,” and according to author Nancy Wadsworth this is “an oft-
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heard variation on this view is that Trump may be a sinner, but he’s one chosen by God for a 
providential mission” (Wadsworth, 2018).  
While morally Trump may not be the ideal candidate he has lived up to the expectations 
of many influential white evangelicals. Since Trump does not attempt to connect to them 
primarily through his own religion, it can be assumed that the reason Donald Trump is treated 
differently from other Republican candidates is that his policies resonate with white evangelicals 
and their leadership. This is not surprising given white evangelicals’ history in politics. They 
have preferred candidates because the morality of the policies they proposed followed white 
evangelicals’ own agenda not necessarily because they were the most moral candidate. In the 
past white evangelicals have responded positively to candidates who used a plethora of religious 
rhetoric to connect with them, but what Trump was offering appeared to be more important than 
his lack of religiosity. In order to receive the level of support he did in 2016, it is necessary to 
understand what evangelicals want now and how Trump gave it to them. For white evangelicals, 
it is conservative policy, not faith that makes Donald Trump “their dream president” 
(Wadsworth, 2018). 
 
Moral Concerns of the New Christian Right 
White evangelicals have a few core issues which define them as a group. Many of the 
moral issues evangelicals were concerned with during the 2016 election came with the 
development of the New Christian Right. The issues which became the core concerns of white 
evangelicals did not start out that way. Throughout the 1970s and 1980s prominent conservative 
Christians created a platform with the goal of altering American culture by getting other 
Christians to reject cultural changes they believed were leading the country in a sinful direction. 
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This activism was spurred by the cultural changes, such as the growth of feminism, gay rights, 
and civil rights, that were occurring in America at the time. For white evangelicals, these 
concerns were both cultural and political. They addressed them both through participating in a 
culture war for America’s future with opponents of their moral values and by influencing 
legislation and judicial decisions through their relationship with conservative Republicans. Their 
major concerns at this time, many of which continue to this day, were abortion, reproductive 
rights, LGBTQ rights, women’s rights, and religious rights. 
 
Abortion 
 While abortion falls under the larger category of reproductive rights, historically it has 
been a much larger issue than other reproductive concerns such as contraceptives for white 
evangelicals. It is important to understand that evangelicals’ opinion on abortion was not always 
static. “In 1968, Christianity Today published a special issue on contraception and abortion, 
encapsulating the consensus among evangelical thinkers at the time” (Dudley, 2012). This issue 
stated that based on scripture, life began at birth, not conception and there was no part in the 
bible which outlawed abortion because a fetus was not the same thing as a soul (FitzGerald, 
2017, pp. 198-200; Dudley, 2012). This general sentiment toward abortion was changed radically 
by the activism of Jerry Falwell along with Schaeffer and Dr. Charles Everett Koop (Dudley, 
2012; Hankins, 2008, pp. 144-145). It was not easy to change the opinions of evangelicals. Many 
anti-abortion activists were frustrated by the apathy of the general evangelical population which 
lasted well into the 1980s (Dudley, 2014). At this point, Falwell began disseminating rhetoric 
that stated that life begins at conception and this is biblically implied (Dudley, 2014). In addition 
to this, evangelicals began to come forward against abortion because of Schaeffer and Koop’s 
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1979 propaganda film Whatever Happened to the Human Race? (FitzGerald, 2017, pp. 176-184; 
Hankins, 2008, p. 145; Martin, 1996, pp. 194-196). This film “connected abortion, infanticide, 
and euthanasia, calling these issues collectively “a culture of death” reminiscent of Nazism” 
(Hankins, 2008, p. 145). These graphic depictions of abortion along with Falwell’s propaganda 
campaign were successful in turning a large number of evangelicals against abortion for anyone, 
not just themselves. Due in large part to this film, “Abortion shot to the head of their list of 
national sins, and opposition to it became known as the “traditional” evangelical position” 
despite the previous nuance with which it had been viewed (FitzGerald, 2017, p. 283). This was 
when abortion began to become a key issue for white evangelicals, and the previous apathy was 
replaced with Falwell’s conservative position. 
 Abortion was a cornerstone issue for Falwell’s Christian Right because it was a central 
point of the larger idea of “Family Values” which was the core of the movement’s identity and it 
was consistent with Falwell’s focus on sexual sin and degeneracy (Dowland, 2009, pp. 606-633; 
Gorski, 2017a, pp. 204-216). Abortion was a threat to their ideal model of the American family. 
They connected abortion to a “devaluation of motherhood and, by extension, the family” 
(Dowland, 2009, pp. 607-608). Many evangelicals would later claim that in 1973 Roe v. Wade 
was what spurred them to political involvement (Dowland, 2009, p. 610). In reality “In the early 
1980s the issue of abortion was still not settled in northern evangelical circles” (FitzGerald, 
2017, p. 283).  The rewriting of history by these evangelicals shows just how central being anti-
abortion had become to the white evangelical identity. These evangelicals wanted to assert that 
they were and had always been on the morally correct side of the abortion issue despite the 
majority of evangelicals initially being apathetic (Dowland, 2009, p. 610). 
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  The anti-abortion sentiment became a foundational part of white conservative evangelical 
movements. Due to this, politicians attempted to connect to these groups by including anti-
abortion sentiments in their rhetoric. Ronald Reagan speaking at an evangelical convention said   
The fight against parental notification is … one example of many attempts to water down 
traditional values and even abrogate the original terms of American democracy … is all 
of Judeo-Christian tradition wrong? Are we to believe that something so sacred can be 
looked upon as a purely physical thing with no potential for emotional and psychological 
harm? (Jefries, 2017, p.210).  
Here Reagan directly references the potential negative impacts of abortion. He deliberately 
includes references to traditional values and implies that there is political value in the ideas of the 
Judeo-Christian tradition. These comments touch on evangelical concerns, and it is clear that 
Reagan understands the political value of taking a stance against abortion when addressing 
evangelicals. This is also supported by Reagan’s choice of Surgeon General, Dr. Charles 
Everette Koop who as discussed earlier was an instrumental part of the New Christian Right’s 
anti-abortion campaign (Hankins, 2008, p. 145). 
 
Reproductive Rights 
 Evangelicals have historically taken issue with both abortion and birth control and often 
conflated the two issues. However, evangelicals’ stance on contraceptives has changed over 
time. Before the 1920s, for evangelicals the only legitimate reason for intercourse was 
reproduction. In the late 1960s, evangelical beliefs about contraception shifted due to growing 
concern about overpopulation in the United States (White, 2012, pp. 5-11; FitzGerald, 2017, pp. 
199-200). Family planning and use of contraception as part of one’s “Christian duty” to prevent 
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overpopulation became widely accepted among the Evangelical community (White, 2012, pp. 8-
9). Even conservative white evangelical leaders such as Billy Graham supported evangelicals 
using family planning (White, 2012, pp. 8-9; FitzGerald, 2017, p. 200). Later evangelical opinion 
shifted again. From 1987 onwards, evangelicals worked to create laws on both the state and 
federal level that criminalized contraception and information relating to it (White, 2012, p. 5-11). 
Much like Catholics, many evangelicals justified this antagonism with a passage from Genesis in 
which God admonishes someone for withdrawing which prevented his wife from being 
impregnated (White, 2012, pp. 6-7).   
Even though evangelical opinions toward some types of contraception progressed in the 
’60s, their opinion on the subject would later be colored by their opinions on abortion. This is 
important to recognize because their strong stance against abortion in the late 1980s would affect 
the way they saw birth control. The attitudes evangelicals had toward contraception were 
changed significantly by the Supreme Court’s decision on Roe v. Wade (White, 2012, pp. 9-11). 
After the decision, contraception and abortion once again became blurred and more conservative 
evangelical groups began preaching about the dangers of contraception (White, 2012, pp. 9-11). 
The relationship evangelicals have with birth control today is not universal. Many see it as a way 
to prevent abortions while others see it as something that has contributed to abortions being more 
widespread (White, 2012, pp. 10-11). It is clear that even when contraception is opposed by 
evangelical groups, it has more to do with their link to abortion rather than a belief that all sex 
must be for purposes of procreation. It is necessary to look at this historical development of 
evangelical opinion on birth control because it helps to illuminate what issues are not a priority 
for evangelicals and are subject to change. How abortion has affected their view of contraception 
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indicates that stopping abortion has historically been a priority for many evangelicals while 
stopping access to all contraception may not be. 
 As will be discussed further, reproductive rights were also inherently tied to 2nd wave 
feminism in the U.S. which the New Christian Right strongly opposed. In the feminist movement 
birth control was a part of the sexual liberation of women. Birth control meant that women could 
more actively pursue nonmarital sexual relationships without the potential consequence of 
pregnancy. This was a problem for evangelicals because it was in opposition to evangelical 
moral standards.  For early evangelicals and fundamentalists “‘morality’ is often just a code 
word for conventional gender behavior and ‘immorality’ a code word for sexual and gender 
impropriety” and they held that women’s role was primarily as mothers (Hankins, 2008, p. 108). 
Even without abortion in the equation, birth control allowed women to forgo motherhood in 
favor of other pursuits which made conservative evangelicals concerned about the future of 
society. 
 
LGBTQ Rights 
 Reproductive rights are central to modern evangelical political involvement; however, 
evangelicals concern with sex is not limited to conception. Sexuality and sexual “deviancy” are 
also major concerns for white evangelical groups. As discussed previously “family values” is the 
central concern of Falwell’s Christian Right. Homosexuality diverges from the traditional value 
of heterosexual marriage. They believe that if the state supports gay marriage, it is supporting the 
destruction of society by destroying the family unit (Hankins, 2008, pp. 132-133). Before the 
1970’s most people “considered homosexuality an aberration”; however, it was not a major issue 
for any religious group because the majority of gay individuals hid their identity to avoid 
39 
 
persecution (Dowland, 2009, p. 625). This meant they were not a visible threat to the moral 
fabric of the country if they remained hidden and were not an issue for evangelicals and other 
conservative Christians until people began to view being gay as a preference and not something 
inherently wrong (Dowland, 2009, pp. 624-627; Hankins, 2008, p. 132). Unlike with abortion 
and reproductive rights, evangelicals have “almost uniformly opposed the gay lifestyle, largely 
because the Bible is quite consistent in its condemnation of homosexual practice” (Hankins, 
2008, p.132). Evangelicals felt they were morally obligated to oppose it if it was influencing 
American morality. 
The 1970s gay rights movement made the issue of homosexuality and the treatment of 
gay men and women in the United States a major political issue (Dowland, 2009, pp. 624-627; 
FitzGerald, 2017, pp. 234-236). Though the movement started in the 1960s, by the 1970s some 
cities in America responded positively to it and passed anti-discrimination legislation which 
shocked evangelicals into action against the growing movement (FitzGerald, 2017, p. 235). As 
the idea of homosexuality began to gain wider acceptance within both the medical community 
and American public the Christian Right and Jerry Falwell became increasingly concerned that 
homosexuals would rise to positions of political power (Dowland, 2009, pp. 624-627). They 
believed that gay activists would “use the power of government to foist their own morality on the 
rest of the population” and this would lead to the normalization of homosexuality causing the 
complete disintegration of moral values within the United States (Dowland, 2009, pp. 624-627; 
Hankins, 2008, p. 133). In order to get moderates to acknowledge gays as a threat, evangelicals 
chose to focus on the image of gays as pedophiles in order to scare the general public and gain 
support in their opposition to gay rights (Dowland, 2009, pp.626-627). This portrayal of gay men 
as sexual predators continues to this day. 
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 Falwell was the president of the Moral Majority, so it is reasonable to assume his 
opinions expressed their general sentiment towards homosexuality. In addition to the gay rights 
movement, another issue that made homosexuality a target for the Christian Right was the AIDS 
crisis. Falwell expressed the opinion that the AIDS crisis was caused by homosexuality. In a 
televised sermon he is reported saying, 
that the acquired immune deficiency syndrome (AIDS) was a divine punishment visited 
on homosexuals for breaking the laws of nature and of God. And he accused the 
homosexual community in the United States of using its political influence to prevent the 
government from acting more quickly to stop the spread of the epidemic (David, 1983).  
In this sermon, Falwell again indicates that there is significant concern among the Christian 
Right about the influence of homosexuals on the United States government. He also suggested a 
complete quarantine of those afflicted by the disease (FitzGerald, 2017, p. 256). This act would 
largely target the gay population in the U.S. and remove them from society.  
Despite evangelicals’ best efforts, homosexuality began to become more accepted in 
America, and gay individuals were able to claim more rights for themselves. Despite their losses, 
evangelicals continue to oppose gay rights. Their recent activity regarding homosexuality shows 
that it continues to be a serious issue from their perspective. The commitment of evangelicals to 
opposing acceptance of homosexuality is most clearly demonstrated in how far they are willing 
to go to spread anti-gay beliefs. For over ten years, conservative evangelical groups in the U.S. 
have actively encouraged anti-gay sentiments in Uganda which resulted in the anti-gay law being 
passed in the country (Mugisha, 2014). Evangelicals’ determination to morally oppose 
homosexuality was not weakened by advancements in gay rights; rather they see advancements 
as evidence that the threat they are opposing is growing stronger. 
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Women’s Rights 
In addition to their concern with the gay rights movement, the Christian Right was also 
concerned with the women’s rights movement. In 1990 Pat Robertson, a prominent evangelical 
leader, wrote in a letter, “feminism makes women leave their husbands, kill their children, 
destroy capitalism, practice witchcraft and become lesbians" (Ruether, 2002). This statement was 
supported by Falwell who also “suggested that the September 11 attacks on the World Trade 
Center and the Pentagon represented God's punishment of America for allowing the existence of 
such evils in this country as feminism, gays, abortion providers, and the ACLU” (Ruether, 2002). 
From the evangelical perspective feminism, like homosexuality, presents a threat to the 
traditional family values they are concerned with protecting. As discussed earlier, reproductive 
rights and abortion became major issues for the Christian Right. Feminists were often the ones 
advocating for both of these which put them in opposition to conservative evangelicals 
(Dowland, 2009, pp. 618-624). Evangelicals believed women and men had specific roles and the 
consequence for giving women access to abortion would be the potential erosion of “the sexual 
order, traditional morality, and the law of God” (FitzGerald, 2017, p. 234). However, as with 
these two issues, evangelical opinion of feminism and the women’s rights movement changed 
over time.  
Originally many evangelicals were interested in feminism and some developed biblical 
arguments that supported the idea of men and women as equals that had been socially 
conditioned into separate roles (Dowland, 2009, pp. 618-620). Evangelicals overall largely 
supported the Equal Rights Amendment (Dowland, 2009, pp. 618-620). This opinion was 
changed in part due to the work of a Catholic named Phyllis Schlafly who marketed the 
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Amendment to evangelicals as something which would destroy “the traditional family concept of 
husband as breadwinner and wife as homemaker," restrict motherhood … and embed "the first 
anti-family amendment in the Constitution"” (Dowland, 2009, pp. 620-621). This campaign was 
successful among conservative Christians who accepted that feminism would denigrate the 
American family and what had started as an attack on the bill turned into a culture war against 
secular feminism (Dowland, 2009, pp. 620-624; FitzGerald, 2017, p. 233). This idea resonated 
with evangelicals because of their perspective on gender roles.  
As discussed earlier, evangelicals often conflate morality and adherence to biblical 
gender roles (Hankins, 2008, p. 108; FitzGerald, 2017, pp. 233-234). Feminism disintegrated 
these traditional roles by allowing women to choose their own role in society. For evangelicals, 
especially evangelical women, this new freedom threatened to destabilize the structure and safety 
of traditional marriage (Dowland, 2009, pp. 610-631; Hankins, 2008, p.115). According to some 
evangelicals “feminist freedom meant each individual was free to pursue his or her own end” and 
this meant men would no longer feel obligations to their family, but instead would prioritize their 
own self-interest leading to an increase in broken families (Hankins, 2008, p.115). 
 
Evangelicals vs. Secularism 
Prayer in Schools 
While the Christian Right developed its platform in opposition to reproductive rights, 
feminism, and gay rights these were not the issues which originally sparked evangelicals’ 
journey to America’s political sphere during their early formation; it was secularization by the 
United States Government (Hankins, 2008, p.144). In order to understand this concern, it is first 
necessary to understand the issue of prayer in schools. In 1962 the Supreme Court declared in 
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Engel v. Vitale that prayer in public schools violated the first amendment and was therefore 
unconstitutional (Goodman, 1984; FitzGerald, 2017, p. 187). Like with many of the issues 
discussed evangelical opinion changed significantly on the issue over time. At first, evangelicals 
supported the Supreme Court’s decision because they opposed the state teaching a sanitized non-
denominational type of religion and they believed it would help them in their fight to prevent 
Catholic schools from receiving federal funding (FitzGerald, 2017, p. 188). This feeling changed 
with a second Supreme Court ruling.  
The Court Abington v. Schempp ruled against devotional Bible reading in public schools. 
Protestant educators had made devotional reading from the King James Bible a part of the 
public-school curriculum in the early nineteenth century. For Catholics, it had been one 
of the reasons to build parochial schools, and for Protestants, it had been a symbol of the 
nation’s Protestant identity (FitzGerald, 2017, p. 188). 
Many evangelicals were not happy with this decision. For Northern evangelicals, this decision 
was about America being a Christian nation and a threat to their protestant identity (FitzGerald, 
2017, p. 188). In 1982 Robert Dugan, president of the National Association of Evangelicals, 
expressed his concern to Congress with the Supreme Court’s decisions in Abington v. Schempp 
and Engel v. Vitale (Goodman, 1984). On the other hand, Southern evangelicals were more 
willing to accept the decision as part of the first amendment which provided them religious 
liberty (FitzGerald, 2017, pp. 188-189). While evangelicals were somewhat divided on school 
prayer, when it came to public schools these Supreme Court rulings were the first signs of the 
state becoming more secular and would lead to a major issue for evangelicals; state intervention 
in Christian schools. 
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Freedom from anti-discrimination 
 In order to understand why the state chose to intervene in Christian schools, it is 
necessary to examine white evangelicals’ relationship with racial integration. In an investigation 
of white evangelicals’ racial history, Nancy D. Wadsworth states “most politically conservative 
white evangelicals actively fought every racial inclusion effort from abolitionism to affirmative 
action” (Wadsworth, 2018). Due to this, evangelicals had a tenuous relationship with 
desegregation even before it became an issue involving their schools. Many Southern 
evangelicals opposed any intervention by the U.S. government to force integration. White 
Southern evangelicals believed that integration would lead to intermarriage which they viewed as 
immoral (FitzGerald, 2017, p. 189). Many churches remained segregated even after public 
institutions became integrated and those in the evangelical community who chose to embrace 
integration were often shunned or driven from their churches (FitzGerald, 2017, p. 189). 
Eventually, due to public pressure, evangelical leaders chose to begrudgingly accept public 
integration while they kept white Christian institutions largely segregated.  
White evangelicals gave up the fight of legal public segregation but continued to practice 
self-segregation among their communities. In the 1960s preachers like Falwell built what came 
to be known as “segregation academies” in response to the integration of the public school 
system (FitzGerald, 2017, p. 237). These schools were run by churches and began to multiply 
rapidly in the 1970s (FitzGerald, 2017, p. 237). In addition to segregation “the motive for 
building them was generally to provide the children of conservative Protestants with religious 
training and to protect them from the contagions of “secular humanism” and the sinful new youth 
culture” (FitzGerald, 2017, p. 237). These institutions were constructed for white conservative 
Christians by white conservative Christians. 
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These schools which had become part of how evangelicals demonstrated their own 
religious agency apart from an increasingly secular government came under threat in the late 
1970s. Under the Carter administration, the IRS planned to revoke the tax-exempt status of any 
private school that did not meet federal integration requirements (Hankins, 2008, pp.143-144; 
FitzGerald, 2017, pp. 137-138). Christian leaders such as Falwell, Bakker, Robertson, and 
Dobson immediately protested the decision viewing it as an attack on American Christianity 
(FitzGerald, 2017, p. 237). Forced integration was the issue that spurred many evangelicals and 
was the issue which developed the Christian Right as a political entity (Hankins, 2008, p. 143-
144; FitzGerald, 2017, pp. 237-238). On other issues of morality such as gay rights and abortion 
white evangelicals felt they could combat the immorality of the issues somewhat through their 
personal choices and teachings within their community; however, this was not an option when 
the government interfered with their schools (Hankins, 2008, p. 144). Evangelicals believe that 
their religious status should make them exempt from anti-discrimination policies and that 
government interference on these issues violates their freedom of religion. 
 
What Evangelicals Want Now 
 White evangelicals as a political bloc are often depicted as unchanging and opposed to all 
progress due to their conservative beliefs. As discussed in the section detailing evangelicals 
historical concerns this is not the case. White evangelicals experience changes within their group 
just like any other demographic group engaged in politics. During the emergence of the New 
Christian Right white evangelical political stances shifted drastically within just a few decades. 
While Donald Trump is not the typical Republican candidate, white evangelicals would have 
voted for when they emerged as a political force it does not mean he isn’t a candidate who fits 
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their values now. For this reason, it is important to identify which issues are most important to 
white evangelicals now and how they have changed as a group since they became an active force 
in politics. 
 
White Evangelicals as Reactionaries 
 In order to understand the motivations of white evangelicals, it is necessary to understand 
that movements controlled by white conservative evangelicals, such as the Christian Right, are 
for the most part reactionary. A reactionary is the only alignment on the political spectrum that 
desires Retrogressive change (Baradat, 2002, p. 16). This means that a reactionary is someone 
that wants to reverse progress. All political alignments left of reactionary including conservative 
allow progressive change from the status quo (Baradat, 2002, p. 16). “Only the reactionary wants 
a change from the status quo to something that existed previously” (Baradat, 2002, p. 16). 
Reactionaries come into being when progress changes the status quo. They seek to move society 
back to a version of the status quo in a fight against progressive change. The New Christian 
Right, as discussed in the historical section, is a clear example of a reactionary group. In an 
interview with Tara Isabella Burton, historian John Fea states “Whenever the United States has 
faced significant demographic or cultural changes, it has always resulted in some kind of 
reactionary backlash. Evangelicals are almost always part of that backlash and, in many cases, 
have led the backlash” (Burton, 2018). Their core values and political issues are a direct response 
to the rise of equal rights movements in the 1960s, and the beginning of government enforced 
integration policies (Hankins, 2008, pp. 105-134; FitzGerald, 2017, pp. 233-238). This is 
illustrated in how their view on issues radically shifted with the growth of Gay Rights, Feminist 
and Civil Rights movements and their entrance to politics being a response to Jimmy Carter’s 
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strong-arming of their private schools to accept integration. All their core political issues center 
around preserving an American system of values which is threatened by progressive change. 
(Dowland, 2009, pp. 606-631; Gorski, 2017a, pp. 173-202). As the country has changed due to 
the success of progressive movements, white evangelical priorities have shifted as well to react 
to current political changes. So, the question becomes what are evangelicals reacting to that 
makes them favor Donald Trump today? 
 
Racial Anxiety 
 White evangelicals have always had anxiety about other races corrupting or replacing 
them. Many Southern white evangelicals fundamentally opposed integration and viewed the 
potential intermarriage resulting from it as immoral (FitzGerald, 2017, p. 189). Their primary 
reason for joining politics was in reaction to the government forcing integration on their schools 
(Hankins, 2008, pp. 143-144; FitzGerald, 2017, pp. 136-138). This anxiety has not improved 
over time. White evangelicals’ anxiety about the status of their race may have actually increased 
due to shifts in demographic trends. The overall percentage of white evangelicals is declining 
while the percentage of non-white evangelicals is on the rise (Jones, 2017). “Between 2006 and 
2016, the proportion of white evangelical Protestants has fallen six percentage points, from 23% 
to 17%” (Jones, 2017). This data refers to what percentage of the total American population are 
white evangelical Protestants and shows that the number of non-white evangelicals has increased 
in proportion. This decline is similar to the general decline in the percentage of white Americans. 
In her research on evangelical opinions on race, Janelle Wong found that “white evangelical 
conservatism correlates strongly with their perceptions of anti-white discrimination, even after 
taking into account economic status, party, age and region” (Wong, 2018). It was found in this 
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survey that 50% of white evangelicals “reported feeling they face discrimination that’s 
comparable to, or even higher than, the discrimination they believe Muslim Americans face” 
(Wong, 2018). Additionally, 50% of white evangelicals believe “immigrants hurt the economy” 
(Wong, 2018). 
 
White Evangelicals and White Nationalism 
White evangelicals’ problems with race do not end with their concerns with their own 
status and economic anxiety. White evangelicals view the United States as a white Christian 
nation. They significantly overlap with another group that heavily favored Donald Trump during 
the 2016 election, white Christian nationalists. White Christian nationalists are often defined by 
four key elements: racism, sacrificialism (which focuses on a need for sacrifice and martyrdom 
to achieve a higher purpose), apocalypticism, and nostalgia (Gorski, 2017b, p. 339). In polls, 
white evangelicals often answer similarly to white Christian Nationalists (Gorski, 2017b, pp. 
338-349). It has been estimated that over two-thirds of white evangelicals today are also white 
Christian nationalists (Gorski, 2017b, pp. 338-349). This number has increased since 2004 when 
only about half of white evangelicals identified this way (Gorski, 2017b, pp. 338-349). The 
increasing number of white evangelicals that identify as white Christian nationalists indicates 
that the importance of white Christian nationalist issues within the white evangelical community 
has grown.  
White evangelicals’ relationship with white nationalism is also evident in the way they 
respond to Trump’s rhetoric. Donald Trump tapped into feelings of America as a white Christian 
nation during his campaign. Trump offers evangelicals an image of the America they want 
(Gorski, 2017b, pp. 338-349). Gorski argues, “Trumpism echoes all the traditional themes of 
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WCN – blood purity, blood conquest, bloody apocalypses, and golden age nostalgia” albeit from 
his own secular perspective (Gorski, 2017b, p. 343). This claim about Trump is supported by 
other sources with one study finding that Trump uses language which affirms white evangelicals 
feelings of marginalization and promises a return to power for them even if he is not the 
idealized Christian candidate they would have preferred (Barrett-Fox, 2018, pp. 502–522). White 
evangelicals’ ties to white supremacy are illustrated most clearly in how evangelicals have 
reacted to new groups changing the demographic make-up of the country. New non-Christian 
non-white groups entering the country threaten America’s status as a white Christian nation. 
 Additionally, white evangelicals have struggled with non-white demographics that are 
already in America and are not the result of recent immigration. Trump’s message has responded 
to this by consistently using negative rhetoric in describing the newly feared groups of 
“Mexicans” and Muslims” (Gorski, 2017b, p. 343). Trump also included the traditional 
antisemitism of white Christian nationalists (Gorski, 2017b, p. 344). He alluded to Jews control 
of politics through big banks and did not mention Jewish victims when speaking about the 
Holocaust (Gorski, 2017b, p. 344). His constant attacks on groups disliked by white Christian 
nationalists made him the favored candidate for their group. The white Christian nationalism 
demonstrated by both white evangelicals and Trump is visible in further issues concerning race 
that white evangelicals found important during the 2016 election.  
 
Opinions on Race 
 White evangelicals’ white nationalism is not a new development; it is something that has 
been part of the development of white evangelicals in the United States. Currently, white 
evangelicals are struggling with racial tensions in the U.S. White evangelicals have not been very 
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supportive of efforts to combat the oppression of minorities in the United States. White 
evangelicals do not believe that police brutality against African Americans is a problem of 
oppression; 72% of white evangelical Protestants “believe that killings of African American men 
by police are isolated incidents” (Cooper, 2015). This is consistent with other white Christian 
sects, but a majority of those with non-Christian religions and those who are religiously 
unaffiliated believe these killings are a part of a pattern of police behavior toward minorities 
(Cooper, 2015). White evangelicals were also more likely to be concerned about anti-Christian 
discrimination than other racial and religious groups with 51% believing Christians face a lot of 
discrimination while only 38% of black Protestants and 25% of white mainline Protestants 
believed the same (Cooper, 2015). White evangelicals like other white denominations are more 
likely to justify symbols which are associated with racism by blacks. When it comes to the 
Confederate flag 70% of white evangelicals “say the Confederate flag is more of a symbol of 
Southern pride” while 76% of black Protestants see it as “a symbol of racism” (Cooper, 2015). 
White evangelicals also believe more than any other group  “enough has been done to 
compensate for past racial discrimination” at 63% (Cooper, 2015). These results all came from 
the Public Religion Research Institute, but similar results were also found from studies done by 
Barna Group. They found 13% of evangelicals said, “racism is mostly a problem of past”. This is 
almost double the total population but is very similar to the percentage of conservatives who 
believed the same (Barna, 2016). They also found that only 56% believed people of color are 
disadvantaged while 67% of Americans believe this and 28% strongly disagreed with the idea 
(Barna, 2016). Evangelicals are less likely to support Black Lives Matter than the average 
American and were the group most likely to use the phrase “all lives matter”. Evangelicals are 
also more likely to believe in “reverse discrimination”, discrimination against whites because of 
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their race (Barna, 2016). This data indicates that evangelicals are a group that is likely to have a 
problem with race today and have tensions with the Black Lives Matter movement. White 
evangelicals’ ambivalence toward racism and belief in their ownership of the United States as a 
white Christian nation was a central component of two major issues that revolved around race 
and religion in the 2016 election. 
 
Fear of Islam  
 While many evangelical issues in 2016 were based on them losing ground on issues they 
already had and their decline, the changing demographics of America also brought two new 
threats. These threats were the rise of Islam and illegal immigration which both clashed with 
white evangelical’s white Christian nationalist tendencies and their anxiety surrounding 
becoming a racial or religious minority.  Over the past 50 years, the number of Muslims in the 
U.S. has increased significantly (Kettani, 2010). While white Christians are an aging group, 42% 
of Muslims in the United States are under the age of 30 (Jones, 2017). Although Muslims 
account for only roughly 1% of Americans, the number of Muslims in North America is 
projected to reach 388 million by 2020, more than double the number in 1950 (Jones, 2017; 
Kettani, 2010). This increase, in combination with their own decline and negative feelings 
toward Muslims, has made the rise of Islam a serious concern for white evangelicals. 
 Part of evangelicals’ distrust of Islam came from its association with the 9/11 terrorist 
attacks and other terrorist activity in the U.S. (Bhatia, 2016, pp. 27-36). Many Christians viewed 
these attacks as part of a larger conflict between Christians and Muslims because of their view of 
the U.S. as a Christian nation (Bhatia, 2016, pp. 27-36). White evangelical leaders also openly 
displayed animosity toward Muslims; “Franklin Graham commenting that the God of Islam is “a 
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different God” and that Islam is “a very evil and wicked religion” (Cox, 2001). Additionally, 
Falwell who is still highly influential among white evangelicals is quoted saying “Muhammad 
was a ‘demon-possessed pedophile’ and that Islam teaches the destruction of all non-Muslims” 
(Falwell, 2002). This is a common trend among influential evangelicals. Pat Robertson, Jerry 
Falwell, Jerry Vines, Jimmy Swaggart, Franklin Graham, Pastor Terry Jones, and Miroslav Volf, 
part of the evangelical faculty at Yale, have all made comments referring to Islam as a violent 
and dangerous religion (Bhatia, 2016, pp. 27-36; Harris, 2016). Many evangelicals do not 
inherently hate Muslims and do value religious pluralism; however, they also fear Muslims, and 
this often prevents a mutual understanding from forming (Bhatia, 2016, pp. 27-36). “White 
evangelicals express more concerns about U.S. Muslims than any other religious group” 
(Shellnutt, 2017). Two-thirds believe “Islam is not part of mainstream American society and 
contend that it encourages violence more than other faiths” (Shellnutt, 2017). White 
evangelicals’ value of religious pluralism appears to be present when evangelicals feel secure in 
their position. One of the major fears white evangelicals display in regard to Islam is the fear that 
Muslims will attempt to take over Christian Nations through forceful conversion (Bhatia, 2016, 
pp. 30-36). Here it can be seen once again that white evangelical fears stem from the prospective 
loss of the United States as a White Christian Nation.  
 Donald Trump was the ideal candidate to alleviate the fears of white evangelicals about 
Islam in the United States. During the lead up to the 2016 election, the Trump campaign released 
a statement stating, “Donald J. Trump is calling for a total and complete shutdown of Muslims 
entering the United States until our country’s representatives can figure out what is going on” 
(Johnson, 2017). This policy came to be known as Trump’s Muslim ban. White evangelicals 
were supportive of this action. Following the election, 76% supported “a policy to stop refugees 
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and to prevent people from seven majority-Muslim countries from entering the U.S.” (Smith 
2017). Additionally, Trump’s rhetoric during the campaign connected with evangelical fears 
about Islamic extremism.  
 
Immigration 
 White evangelicals’ racial anxiety also manifested in another way, fear of immigrants. 
Immigration was a major issue during the campaign. Both Donald Trump and Ted Cruz made it 
a central point of their campaign (Prignano, 2016; Sargent, 2015). As previously discussed, 
Donald Trump’s Muslim ban would have prevented legal immigration from seven Muslim 
majority countries (Prignano, 2016; Gladstone, 2018). White evangelicals overwhelmingly 
supported this (Smith, 2017). Both Trump and Cruz were harsh towards immigrants during the 
campaign and popular with white evangelicals (Prignano, 2016; Sargent, 2015). The root of 
white evangelical fear of immigration stems from their conception of America as a white 
Christian nation (Gorski, 2017b, pp. 338-349). This nationalism is one of the central reasons that 
evangelicals don’t like immigrants.  
Immigrants both Muslim and Latino present a threat to the United States’ identity as a 
white Christian nation. Like Muslims, Latinos are a growing group in the United States (Flores, 
2017). The number of Hispanics in the United States has increased significantly. “Twenty-five 
years ago, nearly nine in ten (87%) Catholics were white, non-Hispanic, compared to 55% today. 
Fewer than four in ten (36%) Catholics under the age of 30 are white, non-Hispanic; 52% are 
Hispanic” (Jones, 2017). This information also indicates that like Muslims Hispanic Catholics 
are a growing young population in the United States while white evangelicals are an aging 
population (Jones, 2017). Aside from Catholics, the overall Hispanic population in the United 
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States has increased by around 500% since 1970, jumping from 9.6 million to 57.7 million in 
2016 (Flores, 2017). This growth makes immigration, especially illegal immigration, from 
Central and South American an issue that it was not previously. 
White evangelicals are suspicious of people coming into the country including refugees. 
While evangelical leaders like Franklin Graham have criticized Trump’s family separation 
policy, Trump has not lost the support of his white evangelical base (Stroop, 2018). White 
evangelicals’ true feelings about immigration were not as visible during the election other than 
their support for candidates with harsh immigration policy proposals. However, following the 
election, their support for Trump’s policies show that Trump’s version of immigration reform 
was what many of them wanted. A poll conducted by The Washington Post and ABC News 
found that 75% of white evangelicals believed that “the federal crackdown on undocumented 
immigrants” was a positive thing compared to 46% of Americans (Burton, 2018).  
Additionally, while evangelicals may not completely agree with some of Trump’s harsher 
measures, they are not necessarily sympathetic to refugees; 68% of white evangelicals agreed 
that “America has no responsibility to house refugees” (Burton, 2018). White evangelicals also 
continue to support one of Donald Trump’s key campaign promises, the U.S. Mexican border 
wall. A survey done in 2019 found “nearly three-quarters of white evangelicals expressed 
support for substantially expanding the wall along the U.S. border with Mexico” (Schwadel & 
Smith, 2019).  
White evangelicals were concerned about issues involving demographic change during 
the election. They opposed large scale immigration because it would change the U.S. from being 
a primarily white and Christian nation. With Muslims, there is a clear pattern of fear from white 
evangelicals and their leaders. For those immigrating from Central and South America the same 
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level of fear is not present, however white evangelical support for restrictions on immigration 
show it was a major concern. During the election, many of evangelicals’ concerns arose in 
reaction to new religious and ethnic circumstances. These concerns aligned with Donald 
Trump’s platform as shown by the post-election support of white evangelicals for Trump’s 
policies. While Trump may not have been an ideal religious choice for evangelicals, his policies 
were ideal to combat white evangelicals’ new fears that arose due to their demographic decline. 
White evangelicals favored Ronald Reagan because his campaign issues aligned with their 
reactionary concerns at the time; this appears to be the case for Donald Trump as well.  
 
Hillary Clinton 
One thing which white evangelicals did not want during the 2016 election was for Hillary 
Clinton to win the presidency. Clinton opposed white evangelicals on their core issues, and white 
evangelicals’ antagonistic relationship with feminism made her even more undesirable to them. 
Most of the support given to Trump by white evangelicals did not occur until after he became the 
Republican nominee, at that point support for Trump was also opposition to Hillary Clinton. 
Evangelicals concern over Clinton is supported by other research which suggests white 
evangelicals may view Trump as representative of a new Christian masculinity which stands in 
direct contrast with Hillary Clinton who represents a dangerous feminine political force (Adams, 
2018, pp. 80-99). This research shows how this opposition to Clinton is connected to a deeper 
concern about the feminization of America. 
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Morality 
Research also suggests that during the 2016 election some of the previous concerns of the 
white evangelical voting bloc had changed. While white evangelicals have demonstrated certain 
patterns of voting in the past centering around the use of religious rhetoric by candidates, there is 
evidence that suggests that evangelicals behaved differently in the 2016 election. Discourse 
around the development of the evangelicals in the Christian Right indicates that white 
evangelicals have changed significantly since their inception in 1980 and that now the group no 
longer behaves the way it has historically in terms of personal morality (Rozell, 2018, pp. 8-10). 
The Public Religion Research Institute found many evangelicals have changed their position on 
the importance of morals and religiosity of candidates (Jones, 2016). The survey found that in 
2011 only 30% of white evangelicals believed someone who acted immorally in their personal 
life could act morally in their professional life (Jones, 2016). In 2016 this number increased to 
72% indicating white evangelicals were more comfortable with the idea that an immoral 
politician could behave ethically while in office (Jones, 2016). It also found that the percentage 
of white evangelicals surveyed that said strong religious beliefs were “very important” for a 
presidential candidate went down from 64% in 2011 to 49% in 2015 (Jones, 2016). This decline 
indicates a change in evangelical values towards presidential candidates before the 2016 election. 
This research suggests that the personal morality of candidates is no longer a major issue for 
white evangelicals, which means that Trump’s immoral behavior did not count against him in the 
election. 
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A threatened Christian future 
 White evangelicals’ core issues in politics have always centered around fighting against 
the corruption of American morality caused by progressive change. The majority of the new 
concerns for white evangelicals in the 2016 election centered around race. White evangelicals 
strained relationship with other races, specifically their white nationalism in combination with 
their declining numbers has made them fear for America’s future as a white Christian nation.   
America’s status as a Christian nation is very important to evangelicals’ relationship with 
politics. “According to Straughn and Feld (2010), the claim that America is a Christian nation 
can also serve as a means for many Christians to align their religious and national identities—
namely, by implying that Christians are more truly American than other religious groups” 
(Braunstein & Taylor, 2017, p. 39). Since this view is so central to their identity threats to it are a 
large concern for white evangelicals. As Christian values decline within the general culture of 
the United States, white evangelicals become more fervent in their beliefs, and their solidarity 
strengthens (Braunstein & Taylor, 2017, pp. 39-40).  
Anxiety surrounding identity decline was a major issue among white Republican voters 
during the 2016 election. Many tea party voters overlap significantly with white evangelicals 
(Braunstein & Taylor, 2017, pp. 33-56). One said “I feel like my country is being stolen by 
people who have come here illegally” (Tesler & Sides, 2018, p. 84). Overall white Republican 
voters had a more negative view of other racial groups than the Republican leadership and felt 
that their position was threatened by these other groups (Tesler & Sides, 2018, pp. 80-87). They 
felt as though the future of their white identity was in jeopardy. As white nationalist Richard 
Spencer put it, “an unconscious vision that white people have— [is] that their grandchildren 
might be a hated minority in their own country” (Tesler & Sides, 2018, p. 88). This concern is a 
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result of whites experiencing hardship in America believing they are suffering because minorities 
have taken what is rightfully theirs (Tesler & Sides, 2018, pp. 87-90). This fear of replacement is 
applicable to white evangelicals whose identity is centered around their race as well as their 
religion. Donald Trump’s extreme rhetoric against illegal immigrants and Muslims as well as his 
apparent apathy toward white supremacists gave him the ability to connect with white voters 
who feared that their country was moving away from being a white Christian nation which was 
threatening to their own status (Tesler & Sides, 2018, pp. 87-90).   
 Due to all the perceived threats to white evangelical identity that were happening in 
America at the time, it can be inferred that the issue white evangelicals cared about most during 
the 2016 election was the preservation of their own identity. Research conducted by Andrew 
Whitehead supports this idea that fear of future decline was a driving force in the 2016 election. 
Christian nationalism is directly tied to “racialist sentiments, equating cultural 
purity with racial or ethnic exclusion” (Whitehead, 2018, p. 150). White evangelicals’ anxiety 
over future decline is tied to both Christian nationalism and white nationalism as part of their 
dual identity. Trump alleviated some of these concerns with rhetoric which firmly supported the 
idea of the United States as a Christian nation (Whitehead, 2018, pp. 150-153). Whitehead 
ultimately concludes that Christian nationalists view their Christianity and their American 
identity as being connected (Whitehead, 2018, p. 165). Christian nationalism was also the best 
predictor of support for Donald Trump showing that Christian nationalists believed that Trump 
would protect America’s status as a Christian nation (Whitehead, 2018, p .165). 
 These traits indicate that in addition to being a reactionary group white evangelicals are 
also an orthodox group (Martí, 2019, p. 2). According to Sorcha Brophy, “orthodox orientations 
are defined not only with an eye toward their past but also—and perhaps more importantly—
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toward projections regarding their future” (Martí, 2019, p.2). As a result of this perspective white 
evangelicals were not concerned with finding a candidate that demonstrated their religious 
values, but instead wanted a candidate capable of protecting those values (Martí, 2019, pp. 2-7). 
Their recent decline has left the group in a vulnerable position so in the 2016 election any 
candidate who was defending them would be favorable. According to Gerardo Martí, “Trump 
generates strong support among white Evangelicals … because of his willingness to enforce their 
convictions through the apparatus of the State” (Martí, 2019, p. 3). He still represents an 
orthodox political force, even if he himself is not religious, through his defense of evangelicals 
(Martí, 2019, pp. 1-7). He is viewed by white evangelicals as being led by God because he has 
shown he will defend their values thus preserving them a future (Martí, 2019, pp. 1-7; 
Whitehead, 2018, pp.150-153). 
Overall the majority of evangelical concerns appear to be rooted in fear of an uncertain 
future for their identity group. Increasing diversity threatens America’s status as a Christian 
nation which in turn threatens the position of white evangelicals. This threatened future was their 
top priority during the 2016 election. Donald Trump was able to effectively capitalize on this 
anxiety through reaffirming the idea that the United States was and would continue to be a white 
Christian nation during his presidency. This strategy earned him large levels of support from 
white evangelicals whose focus was on preventing further decline within their group. 
 
Summary of Existing Analysis 
Opinions during the 2016 election 
 As a major religious group within the United States, many surveys have collected and 
analyzed data regarding white evangelicals. This research indicates specific trends among white 
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evangelicals and highlights several important changes within the group. One of the most 
important changes among white evangelicals was on their views on personal immorality. White 
evangelical attitudes toward candidates were different during the 2016 election than they had 
been in the past. The PRRI/Brookings October 2016 Survey results indicate white evangelical 
feeling during the election cycle. At the time of the survey, 69% of white evangelical Protestants 
supported Donald Trump while only 15% supported Hillary Clinton (Jones, 2016). These results 
are unsurprising since Trump was the Republican nominee and white evangelicals were hostile 
toward Clinton. However, there was another factor that contributed to Trump’s popularity. As 
was discussed previously in the past white evangelicals responded negatively to candidates who 
did not share their personal moral and religious values. They responded positively when 
candidates used strong religious rhetoric. Donald Trump behaved extremely immorally, 
according to white evangelical standards and did not effectively use religious rhetoric during his 
campaign. Despite his policies, this lack of religious campaigning would have hurt him in the 
past. However, white evangelical opinions about the personal values of a candidate have 
changed. The PRRI/Brookings October 2016 Survey revealed that white evangelicals have 
changed their opinions on the necessity of morality for a candidate to be effective. 
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 Figure 1. Concern with official’s personal morality by religion and year. From Jones, (2016).  
The percentage of white evangelical Protestants that believe “an elected official can behave 
ethically even if they have committed transgressions in their personal life” has risen sharply from 
30% in 2011 to 72% in 2016; the largest increase of any group (see figure 1). White evangelicals 
went from the group least likely to hold this belief to the most likely (see figure 1). This change 
among white evangelicals means that things such as the Access Hollywood Tape and past affairs 
were no longer major obstacles to white evangelical support. In the same vein as this change 
white evangelicals have also changed their attitudes about how important it is for a candidate to 
have strong religious beliefs.  
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Figure 2. Importance of president’s religious beliefs to white evangelicals by year. From Jones, (2016). 
In 2011 64% believed it was “very important” while in 2015 only 49% reported it as being “very 
important” (see figure 2). This change means that Donald Trump’s failure to integrate religious 
rhetoric into his campaign was less likely to count against him among white evangelical voters. 
The decrease in both these figures indicates a growing flexibility on the part of white evangelical 
voters toward the moral standards they hold elected officials to. This shift meant that Trump was 
not at as much of a disadvantage as he would have been running in the past. White evangelicals 
would not be dissuaded from voting for him despite the constant criticism of his character in the 
media. This change also meant his policy choices would carry more weight among white 
evangelical voters since his personal character was less concerning to them. This shift can 
partially explain why evangelical voters were willing to accept Donald Trump as a candidate 
despite his moral values diverging from their own.    
 
 
 
2011 
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Evangelical context for the 2016 election 
 In addition to changes in opinion among white evangelicals, the group was also 
experiencing demographic changes leading up to the 2016 election. As has been discussed white 
evangelicals are a reactionary group whose primary concerns have centered around the decline of 
the United States as a white Christian nation. This is relevant to the 2016 election because white 
evangelicals were experiencing demographic shifts that may have contributed to their concerns 
about racial issues going into the election. White evangelicals are a group in decline. 
 
       
             Figure 3. Religious population percentage by year. From Jones, (2017). 
Both white Christians and white evangelicals are currently experiencing a demographic decline. 
The total percentage of Americans that identified as white Christians has dropped from 81% in 
1976 to 43% in 2016 (Jones, 2017). White evangelicals have begun experiencing decline more 
recently falling from 23% in 2006 to 17% in 2016 (see figure 3). Jones writes that evangelicals 
missed the first wave of Christian decline but have not avoided the current trend of decline 
% 
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(Jones, 2017). If this trend of decline continues white evangelicals’ political influence will be 
reduced over time as their voting bloc becomes smaller and less sought after by Republicans.  
One cause of the decline is that white evangelicals are an aging population. There are fewer 
young white evangelicals today than in previous decades.  
     
 
   Figure 4. Religious identity by age cohort. From Jones, (2017). 
In 2016 only 8% of people in the age bracket of 18-29 identified as white evangelical 
Protestants, this number was 14% for 30-49, 21% for 50-64, and 26% for 65+ (see figure 4). This 
data shows that white evangelicals are becoming a group that is primarily made up of older 
generations (see figure 4). The 18-29 age bracket also was more likely to be unaffiliated than any 
other at 38% (see figure 4). This information indicates that not only are younger generations less 
likely to be evangelical they are also less likely to have any type of Christian affiliation. These 
% 
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changes directly feed into white evangelical fears that America’s morality is declining. They 
associate morality with their Christian values, so a decline of Christians in the U.S. is a direct 
threat to their goals of preserving American morality. 
Along with this generational change, there is also another generational shift regarding the 
racial makeup of American evangelicals. In 2016 evangelicals made up 26% of all Americans, 
but white evangelicals only make up 17% of all Americans (Jones, 2017). This percentage is also 
on the decline. “Only half (50%) of evangelical Protestants under the age of 30 are white, 
compared to more than three-quarters (77%) of evangelical Protestant seniors (age 65 or older)” 
(Jones, 2017). The data shows that the racial make-up of evangelicals as a group is shifting. As 
older white evangelicals die evangelicals of color will replace them diminishing the power that 
whites hold within the evangelical group.  
 
Figure 5. Religious identity breakdown for 2016. From Jones, (2017). 
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 Additionally, this means that the political power white evangelicals hold will be reduced as the 
group decreases in size compared to other groups including evangelicals of color. This change is 
important because as has been discussed white evangelicals’ racial identity is just as important in 
their political engagement as their religion. Evangelicals of color are politically and culturally 
distinct from white evangelicals. It is unlikely that evangelicals of color would carry on the 
political traditions of white evangelicals. 
The political differences between non-white and white evangelicals were present in data 
from 2016. In a 2016 study, it was found that when asked who they would vote for in the 2016 
election that 62% of “African-Americans, Hispanic Americans, and Asian-Americans with 
evangelical beliefs” favored Hillary Clinton while 65% of white Americans with evangelical 
beliefs said they would vote for Donald Trump (see figure 6). This indicates that evangelicals as 
a whole are not a unified bloc. Out of Americans who hold evangelical beliefs 45% said they 
would vote for Trump while 31% said they would vote for Clinton. White evangelicals are still 
the most influential evangelicals because they are the currently still the largest racial group 
among evangelicals. However, due to the changing racial demographics, it seems that the 
influence of white evangelicals will decrease over time. These demographic changes also mean 
that evangelicals as a whole will likely become a less conservative group as it is white 
evangelicals that tend to favor Republican candidates. As was discussed earlier one of white 
evangelicals’ top priorities is the preservation of their own group. The current demographic 
trends put this goal in jeopardy and leave white evangelicals in a vulnerable position. While the 
demographic trends in themselves do not explain evangelical support for Trump in combination 
with their white Christian Nationalism and their anxiety about group decline it may indicate why 
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white evangelicals were so enthusiastic to embrace a candidate who aligned himself with white 
America. 
                 Figure 6. Evangelical support for candidates by ethnicities. From Smietana, (2016). 
 
White Evangelicals Political Alignment 
 As well as demonstrating changes recent data also shows some consistent trends among 
white evangelicals. Unsurprisingly the data supports that there is a continuing relationship 
between white evangelicals and the Republican Party. The relationship is still strong in 2016 
with 49% of white evangelicals identifying as Republicans; 31% are independent, and only 14% 
identify as Democrats (see figure 7). Even though only 49% of white evangelicals identify as 
Republican, 62% identify as “politically conservative” (Jones, 2017). A higher percentage of 
white evangelicals are Republican than any other religious group (see figure 7). Even as the 
group declines white evangelicals become less liberal with white evangelical Democrats 
declining from 17% in 2006 to 8% today (Jones, 2017).  
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                  Figure 7. Political party by religious identity. From Jones, (2017). 
The continuing link between the two groups is evident in all presidential elections from 
2004 to 2016. Due to their political conservatism white evangelicals typically vote for 
Republican presidential candidates. During the previous three elections, a large majority of white 
evangelicals voted for the Republican candidate. In 2004 78% of white evangelicals voted for 
Bush, in 2008 74% voted for McCain, and in 2012 78% voted for Romney (see table 1). The data 
also indicates that the relationship was actually stronger during the 2016 election than it had been 
previously. White evangelicals showed more support for Trump than any of the previous three 
Republican candidates; 81% of white evangelicals surveyed by the PEW Research Institute voted 
for Donald Trump (see table 1). This shows that Donald Trump received more white evangelical 
support than any recent Republican candidate.   
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             Table 1. Presidential election results by religious affiliation. From Smith, (2016). 
 
Support for Anti-Muslim Policies 
 Another important thing that previous research provides is further evidence that 
Donald Trump’s Islamophobic policies are one reason that white evangelicals support him. Data 
from the Pew Research Center found 76% of white evangelicals surveyed approve “of a policy to 
stop refugees and to prevent people from seven majority-Muslim countries from entering the 
U.S.” (see figure 8). This is the highest amount of support among any non-political demographic 
group (see figure 8). This data shows that Trump’s anti-Muslim policies are successfully 
addressing white evangelicals support about extremist Islam. Support for his policies as president 
shows that Trump has been able to give white evangelicals what they want which backs up the 
idea that fear of Muslims was a major factor in their 2016 vote. 
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    Figure 8. Support for the Muslim ban by identity. From Smith, (2017). 
 In addition to supporting the Travel Ban other research also supports white evangelicals’ 
continued fear of Islam. It was found that 75% of white evangelicals were “‘very concerned’ 
about extremism in the name of Islam around the world”, and 69% were “‘very concerned’ about 
extremism in the name of Islam in the U.S.” (see table 2). Additionally, 51% of white 
evangelicals said, “there is ‘great deal’ or ‘fair amount’ of support for extremism among U.S. 
Muslims” (see table 3). Smith comments that “This is a minority viewpoint in every other major 
religious group” (Smith, 2017). This data suggests that white evangelicals did not just support 
71 
 
Trump in opposition to Clinton. Their support for him did not wither following the election 
because he has effectively addressed their concerns while in office. Alternatively, it can 
represent a continuation of evangelical concerns about Islamic extremism exhibited during the 
election. The data suggests that evangelicals feel that Trump is effectively defending the U.S. 
from the “Islamic extremism” they are concerned about.   
 
 
 
Table 2. Concern over Islamic extremism by identity. From Smith, (2017). 
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Table 3. Belief in U.S. Muslims support of extremism by identity. From Smith, (2017). 
 
Evangelical support for Trump in the post-election period   
As the Republican candidate, it made sense that white evangelicals would support Donald 
Trump during the election. However, as has been shown white evangelical support was not 
limited to the Republican candidacy. In addition to supporting Trump’s policies, white 
evangelicals have also seen Donald Trump as more favorable than all Americans (see figure 9). 
During the primaries, Trump’s favorability was under 50% but then increased to 61% following 
his nomination (see figure 9). His favorability went up even further following the election to 
74% in February 2017 (see figure 9). Following this, support for him among white evangelicals 
has fluctuated but has never dropped below 65% (see figure 9). In March 2018 it was at its 
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highest point within the data range at 75% (see figure 9). Additionally, the gap between what all 
Americans think of Donald Trump and white evangelicals has widened with all Americans 
viewing Trump as less favorable. In October 2015 white evangelicals were 18% more likely to 
find Trump favorable while in March 2018 they were 33% more likely (see figure 9). These 
results indicate that white evangelicals support for Trump has grown since the election and their 
level of support separates them from the general populace. This growth in support shows that 
white evangelicals did not just vote for Trump as the Republican nominee or in opposition to 
Hillary Clinton since he has continued, to be favorable among a majority of them over a year into 
his presidency. Since support for him has continued, it can be inferred that his policies were the 
biggest factor in white evangelical support as his goals have not changed since taking office and 
white evangelical support has remained high.   
 
       Figure 9. White evangelical support for Trump over time. From Jones, (2018). 
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Methodology 
 The previous research indicates that Donald Trump did not possess the religious rhetoric 
or characteristic usually used to court white evangelicals. It is expected that the data will show 
that white evangelicals’ support for Trump is due to his key positions aligning with issues that 
have been either historically important or have recently become important to white evangelicals. 
The topics which white evangelicals should be most likely to have strong opinions on include, 
gay marriage, religious freedom, abortion, immigration, Islamic extremism, and the declining 
status of the United States as a white Christian nation. Some questions that require further 
research include understanding the full overlap between white nationalists and white 
evangelicals. Previous research indicates that these groups support Donald Trump for similar 
reasons; however, the full extent of their support for the new 2018 Republican House of 
Representatives has not been fully established (Gorski, 2017b, pp. 338-349). Another topic that 
would require further research was to what extent the relationship with Donald Trump has served 
to further radicalize an already reactionary group? Little data is out for 2018 and 2019, so it is 
not yet possible to fully analyze if Donald Trump’s presidency has made white evangelicals 
significantly more hostile towards groups they oppose or if they retain the same feeling they did 
during the 2016 election. Finally, more research should be conducted on the growth of the 
Christian Right and whether Trump’s election caused growth or decline within the movement. 
Additionally, it should be examined if the Christian Right’s leaders have changed in any way in 
order to accommodate Trump’s unorthodox politics in order to gain further influence as any 
changes may suggest a changing dynamic in the relationship between sitting presidents and 
white evangelical leaders. 
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Data sources and analysis 
 For the data section of this paper recent data from both the Public Religion Research 
Institute (PRRI), and the Pew Research Center was used (see APPENDIX A). “All PRRI public 
opinion research is based on probability sampling to ensure that results are broadly 
representative of the population of interest” (PRRI About). The Pew Research Center conducts 
surveys through “random digit sample of both landline and cellphone numbers in all 50 U.S. 
states and the District of Columbia” (Pew Research Center, Our survey). 
All data sets were filtered by selecting cases in the SPSS data sets. It was filtered to only 
include participants that identified as white, a Protestant, and “would describe [themselves] as a 
'born-again' or evangelical Christian”. Questions relevant to white evangelicals’ political beliefs 
were examined. Questions were selected based on historical research which indicated evangelical 
values and issues that were major concerns during the 2016 election, specifically regarding 
Donald Trump. 
For each relevant question, the number of responses for each answer was counted using 
the Countif formula in Excel for both the white evangelical group and the data from the total 
survey. The numbers were converted into percentages excluding participants who did not know 
or refused to answer the questions. The percentages based on the white evangelical data sets 
were examined to see how a majority or large percentage of white evangelicals answered in 
order to identify white evangelical values. Additionally, the white evangelical percentages 
calculated from the survey were compared with the percentages from the total survey in order to 
determine if there were any differences between white evangelicals and the general population 
surveyed. The percentages of questions that appeared across multiple years were compared to 
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establish changes in the attitudes of both white evangelicals and the total population surveyed 
over time. 
 
Tables, Graphs, and Analysis  
Previous research has established the core issues of white evangelicals; however, research 
often looks at white evangelical leaders who are extremely vocal in politics. As was discussed 
earlier despite their clear link with the Republican Party white evangelicals may hold a variety of 
opinions on different issues. Additionally, white evangelicals may have changed their opinions 
on past issues since this research was conducted. This is entirely plausible considering that white 
evangelical opinion has in the past shifted greatly on issues such as abortion, contraception, and 
women’s rights. For this reason, it is important to establish, through recent survey data, that 
white evangelicals’ opinions and voting patterns are consistent with previous research and these 
were indeed the core issues which influenced their vote during the 2016 election. Data also 
shows white evangelicals’ opinion of Donald Trump. Data on Trump did not exist until 2015; 
however, earlier data can show what issues white evangelicals agreed with Trump on.     
 
Continuing views on immigration 
One of the primary concerns for white evangelicals during the 2016 election was 
immigration. This has been a consistent concern for white evangelicals since 2010. The 
percentage of white evangelicals who viewed immigrants as either a burden or a threat to  
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American values has remained above 50%, and changes have been within 5 percentage points 
(see figure 10). The general population has also remained relatively consistent across the three 
surveys (see figure 10). White evangelicals were consistently more likely than the total 
population to view immigrants negatively (see figure 10). The greatest difference between the 
two groups was in 2016 when white evangelicals were 20% more likely to view newcomers to 
the United States as a threat to American values (see figure 10). These results support the idea 
that white evangelicals are more concerned with immigration than the general public. The fact 
that a majority of white evangelicals have viewed immigrants negatively since 2010 shows that 
this was an ongoing concern for them and that it was a concern going into the 2016 election.  
         Figure 10. Opinions on immigrants. Created with data from PRRI. (2010; 2015; 2016a).1 
                                                             
1 The American values surveys for 2010 and 2016 asked if the statement “Immigrants today are a burden on our 
country because they take our jobs, housing and health care” was more aligned with the respondent’s values than 
the positive opposing statement. The 2016 American values survey asked of variation of this question where the 
negative statement was “The growing number of newcomers from other countries threatens traditional American 
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Concern over immigration is also evident in which issues have been most important in 
recent elections. When voting in congressional and presidential elections from 2010 to 2014 the 
most important issue for both white evangelicals and the general population has consistently 
been the economy (see table 4). It also appears that white evangelicals have similar priorities to 
the general public on all other issues, with the largest disparity between the groups being only 
8% (see table 4). This data also shows that immigration became a more important issue for both 
groups from 2010 to 2014 (see figure 11).  If this trend continued into 2016, then immigration 
may have been an even more important issue in the 2016 election. Additionally, as the 3rd most 
important issue for white evangelicals in 2014 it was a substantial priority for white evangelicals 
two years prior to the 2016 election (see table 4).    
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                             
customs”. The two statements are used together in this data since they are both variations of questions which are 
designed to determine if immigrants are seen as helpful or harmful by the respondents. 
         Table 4. Most important factor for voting. Created with data from PRRI. (2010: 2012a: 2014a). 
Issue that is 
most important 
to respondent’s 
vote 
2010 White 
Evangelicals 
n=1,494 
2010 Total 
Survey 
n=3,013 
2012 White 
Evangelicals 
n=299 
2012 Total 
Survey 
n=3,003 
2014 White 
Evangelicals 
n=812 
2014 Total 
Survey 
n=4,507 
The economy 40% 48% 62% 61% 35% 39% 
The federal 
budget deficit 
13% 10% 2% 3% 14% 15% 
Immigration 8% 7% 12% 10% 18% 14% 
The wars in Iraq 
and Afghanistan 
9% 9% 14% 19% 21% 22% 
Health care 19% 19% 3% 2% 4% 4% 
Same-sex 
marriage and 
abortion 
10% 6% 6% 4% 6% 4% 
Other (VOL.) 1% 1% 1% 1% 2% 2% 
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     Figure 11. Immigration as the primary concern. Created with data from PRRI. (2010: 2012a: 2014a). 
 
In addition to older data which shows immigration was a continuous concern data 
collected just prior to the 2016 election shows the level of concern of white evangelicals on 
specific immigration issues. White evangelicals were more likely to think that issues that 
involved keeping illegal immigrants out were “very important”; 80% believed that improving 
border security was “very important”, 22% more likely than the general population, and 51% 
believed increasing deportation of illegal immigrants was” very important” (see figure 12). This 
was 21% higher than the total population (see figure 12). They were also 24% more likely than 
the total population to say it was “very important” to keep illegal immigrants off government 
benefits at 80% of white evangelicals (see figure 12). Additionally, 69% thought it was “very 
important” to prevent immigrants from overstaying their visas (see figure 12). On the other hand, 
white evangelicals appear to be less concerned with a path for illegal immigrants to become legal 
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citizens. Only 19% of white evangelicals said establishing a way for most immigrants currently 
in the country illegally to stay here legally was “very important” and 26% said that it was very 
important to allow illegal immigrant children to stay in the U.S (see figure 12). White 
evangelicals appear to care more about keeping out and removing illegal immigrants than about 
creating a path to citizenship. This negative response to illegal immigrants further supports the 
idea that Trump was able to use immigration to win over white evangelicals. Trump’ s rhetoric 
and policies regarding immigration have been exceptionally harsh. Directly before the 2016 
elections white evangelicals prioritized keeping immigrants out and removing them from the 
country which aligns their interests with Donald Trump on this issue.  
          
           Figure 12. Importance of immigration issues. Created with data from Pew. (2016b). 
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Continuing views on abortion 
A historical concern of white evangelical that has remained important in recent years is 
abortion. Evangelicals have been consistent on their opinions on abortion from 2010-2016. The 
majority believe that abortion should be illegal in “most cases” or “all cases” (see figure 13). The 
general population has also been consistent with the majority believing that abortion should be 
legal in “most cases” or “all cases” (see figure 13). This data indicates that abortion rights have 
remained a concern for white evangelicals since the majority believe it should almost always be 
illegal. Outlawing abortion is still a primary concern for the group. This consistent concern 
surrounding abortion is relevant to the 2016 election because whoever was elected in 2016 would 
likely be responsible for choosing several Supreme Court judges. For abortion to be illegal on a 
federal level, the Supreme Court must overturn the Roe vs. Wade decision. As almost all 
Republican candidates are pro-life this information does not explain early support for Trump; 
however, it does contribute to support for him as the nominee since Democrats usually run on a 
platform that includes pro-choice. Voting for Donald Trump was the best way for white 
evangelicals to realize their goal of making abortion illegal. 
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Figure 13. Opinion on abortion over time. Created with data from PRRI. (2010: 2011: 2012a: 2014a: 
2015: 2016a). 
 
 
 
Continuing views on Gay Rights 
Another historical concern that can still be seen today is opposition to homosexual 
behavior. In 2010 the white evangelicals surveyed were 10% more likely to report that their 
clergy spoke to them about gay people (see table 5). Of those whose clergy spoke to them 82% 
of them discouraged homosexual relationships (see figure 14). This was 14% higher than what 
the general population reported (see figure 14). This data indicates that white evangelical clergy 
more likely to discourage homosexuality among their followers which is consistent with their 
historical views on homosexuality. White evangelical clergy have historically been the political 
leaders within the group. Since they are more likely to discourage homosexuality this influences 
the views of the group.  
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Has the respondent’s clergy 
discussed gays recently 
2010 White Evangelicals 
n=1,494 
2010 Total Survey 
n=3,013 
Yes 50% 40% 
No 50% 60% 
          Table 5. Discussion of homosexuality by clergy. Created with data from PRRI. (2010).   
Figure 14. How clergy discusses homosexuality. Created with data from PRRI. (2010 A). 
 
Aside from their clergy white evangelicals overall continue to be oppositional to gay 
rights. White evangelicals have been consistently more likely to oppose gay marriage than the 
general population (see figure 15). However, this opposition has declined slightly since 2012 
which mirrors a decline in the total population (see figure 15). While the slight decline may 
indicate a trend towards acceptance the higher percentage opposed is consistent with white 
evangelicals’ historical conflict with gay rights and shows that it has remained a key issue. White 
evangelicals’ opposition to gay marriage is especially relevant to the 2016 election because gay 
marriage was officially legalized in all 50 states in 2015 (Chappell, 2015). Like abortion, this 
issue probably did not help Trump in the primary. However, in the general election, a majority of 
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white evangelicals would want to vote for the Republican candidate in order to stop what they 
considered to be the immoral practice of gay marriage and this may be a contributing factor to 
their overall support for Donald Trump. 
Figure 15. Opposition to gay marriage. Created with data from PRRI. (2011 A: 2012 A: 2014 A: 2015 A: 
2016 A).  
 
 
Continuing concerns over status 
 
 As has been discussed previously white evangelicals experience a lot of anxiety 
surrounding the continuation of their group in the United States. A majority of current white 
evangelical concerns stem from a fear that white Americans are losing their rights to racial 
minorities and non-Christians. The survey data supports this assessment. In both 2014 and 2016, 
a higher percentage of white evangelicals believed that discrimination against whites was equal 
to discrimination against blacks and other minorities  (see figure 16). In 2016, 67% of white 
evangelicals “mostly agreed” or “completely agreed” that this was the case (see figure 16). This 
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was 20% higher than the general population (see figure 16).  In 2016 a majority of white 
evangelicals believed that they faced as much discrimination as minorities in the United States. 
White evangelicals also believed they were victims of another type of discrimination. In 2015 
53% of white evangelicals believed that evangelicals faced a lot of discrimination in the United 
States (see figure 17). This was 24% higher than the general population (see figure 17). White 
evangelicals were more likely to believe they were victims of both racial and religious 
discrimination.  In 2012 white evangelicals were more likely to believe that the government has 
paid too much attention to the problems of blacks and other minorities than the general public 
surveyed; 45% of white evangelicals completely agreed or mostly agreed with this idea 
compared to only 32% of the general public who reported the same (see figure 18). Together this 
data indicates that white evangelicals were feeling that they were the victims of discrimination. 
Since a majority felt the government was paying too much attention to minorities, it is likely that 
a majority felt the government was not paying enough attention to the problems of white people 
in America.   
      Figure 16. Severity of anti-white discrimination. Created with data from PRRI. (2014a: 2016a). 
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       Figure 17. Severity of anti-evangelical discrimination. Created with data from PRRI. (2015). 
 
 
 
 
Percent of respondents who agree that the government was paying too much attention to 
the problems of minorities 
     Figure 18. Opinion of governments stance on minority issues. Created with data from PRRI. (2012b). 
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Additionally, surveys have indicated white evangelicals themselves do not take the problems of 
other races seriously. When it came to opinions on protests against police brutality against 
African Americans a majority of white evangelicals, 58%, think the protests have been motivated 
a great deal by existing bias against the police (see table 6). This is 14% higher than the total 
population (see table 6). This data shows that white evangelicals believed that there is 
widespread bias against police within police brutality protests and shows they are less 
sympathetic towards this issue than the general population. Their belief that these protests are a 
result of existing bias against the police show that they do not see the severity of police brutality 
against minorities as a major problem. Their own dismissiveness toward minority issues may 
explain why they believe the government pays too much attention to minorities. 
How much, a respondent thinks 
protests against police brutality 
toward blacks have been 
motivated by bias against the 
police 
 August 16 – September 12, 
2016 White Evangelicals 
n=849 
August 16 – September 12, 
2016 Total Survey 
n=4,538 
A great deal 58% 44% 
Some 33% 37% 
Not much 7% 13% 
Not at all 2% 6% 
    Table 6. Motivations of Black Lives Matter protests. Created with data from Pew. (2016b). 
 
The idea that white evangelicals were anxious about their future status going into the 
2016 election is further supported by their concerns over religious liberty and how they feel 
within their own country. In 2012 white evangelicals were concerned about religious liberty; 
77% believed that religious liberty in America was being threatened (see figure 19). This is 28% 
higher than the general public (see figure 19). Additionally, in 2014 78% of white evangelicals 
believed it was harder for people with strong religious faith than it was 10 years ago (see table 
7). This is 28% higher than the total population. These results show that in 2014 white 
evangelicals felt that if they had strong religious faith life in America had become more difficult 
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for them (see table 7). These findings indicate that white evangelicals were seriously concerned 
about the relationship between the United States government and religion. Following the 2016 
election white evangelicals were concerned with the state of America. A majority of white 
evangelicals “completely agreed” or “mostly agreed” that they felt like a stranger in their own 
country; 68% (see figure 20). This is higher than all Americans who answered the survey which 
was 45% (see figure 20). A slight majority of white evangelicals also believed that attempts to 
push diversity in the United States were always at the expense of whites; 54%. Only 34% of the 
general population believed the same (see figure 20). In addition to race white evangelicals 
appear very concerned about gender; 73% believing that society is now too feminine (see figure 
20). This is 30% higher than the general population which was at 43% (see figure 20). These 
results indicate that after the 2016 election white evangelicals felt more uneasy about the state of 
the country. It also shows that white evangelicals felt that the increasing diversity of the country 
was a threat to their own interest and implies that white evangelicals have a problem with 
institutions becoming more feminine which is consistent with their historical struggle with the 
feminist movement.  All of this data together strongly suggests that white evangelicals were 
feeling displaced or threatened by other groups prior to the 2016 election. This was a major fear 
for them and they were looking for a candidate who would put their interests first. Donald 
Trump’ s campaign consisted of him lashing out at groups that were critical of him and praising 
the white Americans that made up his base. His policies against immigrants and Muslims as well 
as his nonchalant attitude toward white nationalists made him very attractive to white 
evangelicals who were feeling vulnerable about their own status in the United States. 
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           Figure 19. Concern over religious liberty. Created with data from PRRI. (2012b). 
 
Figure 20. 2016 concerns. Created with data from PRRI. (2016b). 
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Table 7. Difficulty of living as a person of faith in the United States. Created with data from Pew. (2014). 
 
 
Along with this sense of being at a disadvantage as a white evangelical in the U.S., the 
data also shows that white evangelicals feel very differently toward different groups. White 
evangelicals unsurprisingly have warm feelings toward evangelical Christians, only 2% had 
feelings which ranged from 0-33 (see table 8). White evangelicals have more mixed feelings 
toward Mormons. These feelings reflected those of the total population with a difference of only 
1% between the two groups (see table 8). White evangelicals had much cooler feelings towards 
Muslims and Atheists; 60% reported feelings of 0 to 33 towards Muslims, 19% higher than the 
total population (see table 8). In addition, 62% reported feelings of 0 to 33 towards Atheists, 
25% higher (see table 8). While white evangelicals have historically been suspicious of 
Mormons, it appears that at least in 2014 they were not more so than the general population. The 
results also show that white evangelicals feel colder towards Muslims and Atheists. This is 
consistent with their concerns over terrorism and their opinions regarding Islamic extremism and 
supports the idea that Donald’s Trump negative rhetoric regarding Muslims helped him secure 
the white evangelical vote.   
 
 
 
Respondents opinion on if living in the U.S. 
today is easier, harder, or about the same as it 
was 10 years ago for people who have strong 
religious faith 
MAY 30-JUNE 30, 2014 
White Evangelicals 
n=439 
MAY 30-JUNE 30, 2014 
Total Survey 
n=3,217 
Easier today 4% 11% 
Harder today 78% 50% 
About the same as 10 years ago 18% 39% 
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How respondents felt about different groups  
(0 meant they felt very cold and 100 meant they felt very warm) 
Feeling scale: evangelical Christians MAY 30-JUNE 30, 2014 
White Evangelicals 
n=439 
MAY 30-JUNE 30, 2014 
Total Survey 
n=3,217 
Rating of 67 to 100 84% 54% 
34 to 66 14% 42% 
0 to 33 2% 4% 
Feeling scale: Mormons   
 
Rating of 67 to 100 28% 27% 
34 to 66 45% 46% 
0 to 33 27% 27% 
Feeling scale: Muslims 
 
  
Rating of 67 to 100 7% 17% 
34 to 66 33% 42% 
0 to 33 60% 41% 
Feeling scale: Atheists 
 
  
Rating of 67 to 100 6% 23% 
34 to 66 32% 40% 
0 to 33 62% 37% 
                  Table 8. Feelings toward religious groups. Created with data from Pew. (2014). 
 
Trends as a religious group 
Previous research suggests that one of the driving forces behind evangelical participation 
in politics is their view of America as a white Christian nation. In 2010 a similar percentage of 
white evangelicals and the general population agreed that America is and always has been a 
Christian nation at 47% and 48% (see table 9). An almost equal number of white evangelical 
respondents, 48%, believed that America was previously a Christian Nation, but is not one 
currently while only 36% of the general public said the same (see table 9). Only 5% of 
evangelicals believed America has never been a Christian nation (see table 9). The general 
population was more likely to believe this with 16% agreeing (see table 9). Overall 95% of white 
evangelicals believe that American is currently or was a Christian nation while 84% of the 
general population believed the same (see table 9). These results indicate that a large majority of 
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white evangelicals view America as originally being a Christian nation. The data supports the 
earlier research that indicates the preservation of a white Christian nation is an important issue 
for white evangelicals since a majority view it as having been one. 
  
Respondents opinion on the United States 
Status as a Christian nation 
2010 White Evangelicals 
n=1,494 
2010 Total Survey 
n=3,013 
America has always been and is currently a 
Christian nation  
47% 48% 
America was a Christian nation in the past, 
but is not now 
48% 36% 
America has never been a Christian nation 5% 16% 
       Table 9. Opinion on the U.S. as a Christian nation. Created with data from PRRI. (2010).  
 
White evangelicals have historically been a major component of the Christian Right. 
Today a large portion of white evangelicals continue to identify with this movement. The 
percentage of white evangelicals surveyed who identify as part of the Christian Right has 
remained mostly unchanged between 2010, 2014, and 2015 (see figure 21). White evangelicals 
were much more likely to associate themselves with the Christian Right than everyone who was 
surveyed (see figure 21). This confirms the idea that white evangelicals associate with and make 
up a large portion of the Christian Right. Their continued association also shows white 
evangelicals support for the goals of the Christian Right.  
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      Figure 21. Christian Right Membership. Created with data from PRRI. (2010 A: 2014 A: 2015 A). 
 
As mentioned earlier white evangelical clergy are an important part of their political 
engagement. This makes the issues white evangelical clergy discussed in 2016 relevant to how 
white evangelicals voted in the election. A majority of clergy for both white evangelicals and the 
total population did not speak about any political issue that was in the survey; however, a decent 
proportion did discuss them. White evangelicals were more likely to report their clergy spoke to 
them about being against abortion, at 32% compared with 24% for the total survey (see figure 
22). White evangelicals were also more likely to report being spoken to in defense of religious 
liberty; 48% compared with 35% (see figure 22). They were also more likely to report their 
clergy has spoken out against homosexuality; 34%, compared to 19% for the full survey (see 
figure 22). These results show that white evangelical clergy were more likely to give their 
parishioners a negative opinion on abortion and homosexuality and implied to them that religious 
liberty was under attack and in need of defense. These results support the earlier data which 
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showed white evangelicals continuing concern surrounding abortion, religious liberty, and 
homosexuality. Only 11% of white evangelical clergy spoke about welcoming immigrants while 
22% of the general public’s clergy did (see figure 22). These results are consistent with white 
evangelicals’ negative views about immigrants. 
 Only 4% of white evangelicals reported their clergy spoke in support of a candidate (see 
figure 23). This is lower than the total population’s 6% (see figure 23). However, of clergy who 
did support a candidate, 62% of white evangelical clergy spoke in support of Donald Trump (see 
figure 24). Only 25% of the total survey said the same (see figure 24). This means that it was 
very unlikely that individual white evangelical clergy members directly encouraged their 
parishioners to support a candidate, but if they did the majority endorsed Donald Trump.  
       Figure 22. Issues clergy has spoken about. Created with data from Pew. (2016a). 
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Figure 23. Whether respondent’s clergy have spoken in support of a candidate. Created with data from 
Pew. (2016a). 
 
 
 
Figure 24. Whether respondent’s clergy have spoken in support of Donald Trump. Created with data from 
Pew. (2016a). 
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Current priorities 
 
The summer before the 2016 election white evangelicals surveyed indicated that they 
were more likely to connect their views on economic policy, immigration policy, terrorism 
policy, foreign policy, the federal budget, abortion, and gun policy with their fundamental beliefs 
about right and wrong than the general population (see figure 25). This shows which issues were 
a moral priority for white evangelicals in 2016. White evangelicals were much more likely to 
strongly connect their values to terrorism policy; 62%, 12% higher than the general population. 
They connected the federal budget to it at 44%, 11% higher, and abortion at 73%, which was 
21% higher (see figure 25). These are the values that strongly separate white evangelicals from 
the general public. The only issues that a lower percentage of white evangelicals strongly 
connected with their values were healthcare policy, which was 6% lower and climate change 
which was 12% lower (see figure 25). This shows these issues are less important to white  
Figure 25. Connection between personal morality and policies. Created with data from Pew. (2016a). 
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evangelicals’ morality. Overall white evangelicals were more likely to strongly connect political 
issues to their own morality. Of all the issues listed white evangelicals were most likely to 
connect their views on abortion to their morality which is consistent with their historical stance 
on the issue. 
The previous data is consistent with a later survey which showed 79% of white 
evangelicals believed that having an abortion was morally wrong (see figure 26). This is 36% 
higher than the total population. White evangelicals were also opposed to homosexuality with 
73% saying it was morally wrong (see figure 26). This was 49% higher than the total population 
(see figure 26). These results indicate that white evangelicals’ historical opposition to abortion 
and homosexuality has continued until at least before the 2016 election. On the other hand, a 
very low percentage of both white evangelicals and the total population believe that using 
contraception is morally wrong at 4% and 2% which indicates people using contraception was 
not a priority for white evangelicals going into the 2016 election (see figure 26).  
 Figure 26. Moral status of different actions. Created with data from Pew. (2016b). 
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The groups that white evangelicals sympathized with just prior to the 2016 election also 
can show their positions that they voted from. In 2016 62% of white evangelicals reported that 
they sympathize a lot with people who say businesses should be able to refuse service to same-
sex couples for religious reasons (see figure 27). This is twice as much as the total population. 
White evangelicals were also more likely to sympathize a lot with those who say employers have 
the right to refuse to provide birth control through healthcare for a religious reason; 47%, 24% 
higher than the total population (see figure 27). They were also more likely to sympathize a lot 
with those who said transgender people should be made to use the bathroom that corresponds 
with the gender they were assigned at birth; 54% agree with this which is 23% higher than the 
total population (see figure 27). This data shows that evangelicals are significantly more likely to 
accept discrimination against gays and women in need of birth control when a religious 
justification is given than the general population. Additionally, they were more supportive of 
those who wanted to discriminate against transgender people. These results support white 
evangelicals’ prioritization of religious liberty and their opposition toward the LGBT 
community. It also shows they were more likely to side with individuals that held these 
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positions. All of these positions are part of the Republican platform and would have helped 
Trump during the general election. 
     Figure 27. Sympathy for certain groups. Created with data from Pew. (2016b). 
 
After the election 
The trend of white evangelicals being anti-immigrant and against gay rights continues 
following the election. In 2017 white evangelicals were more likely to favor allowing businesses 
to refuse service to gays and lesbians with 61% saying they “strongly favor” or “favor” it 
compared 34% of the general public (see figure 28). This is consistent with their past views on 
gay marriage and homosexuality. White evangelicals also favored a border wall more than the 
general population. A total of 62% said they “strongly favor” or “favor” it (see figure 28). In 
comparison, only 39% of the total population said the same (see figure 28). The border wall with 
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policy indicates both a concern with illegal immigration which is consistent with pre-election 
data and a continued support for a key goal of the Trump presidency. It also indicates that white 
evangelicals believe that a wall is an effective way to reduce immigration. 
Figure 28. Favor for allowing stores to discriminate against gays and border wall. Created with data from 
PRRI. (2017). 
 
 
Following the election white evangelicals continued to be more supportive of Donald 
Trump than the total population showing that he has effectively addressed some of the concerns 
they had during the election; 71% of white evangelicals “strongly approved” or “somewhat 
approved” of the job Donald Trump is doing as president while only 45% of the total population 
reported the same (see figure 29). White evangelicals and the general population were about the 
same on whether Trump could do something to lose their approval (see table 10). When it came 
to feelings toward the presidency white evangelicals were more likely to respond positively; 61% 
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hand, a majority of the general population responded negatively with 62% reporting they were 
“disappointed”, “worried”, or “angry” because of the administration (see figure 30). In 2017 the 
majority of white evangelicals were also more likely to find Trump favorable with 70% finding 
Trump “very favorable” or “mostly favorable” compared with only 45% of the general public 
(see figure 31). These results indicate continued support of Trump by white evangelicals after the 
2016 election and show they still feel positively about his administration while the majority of 
the general public did not. 
  
                    Figure 29. Approval for Donald Trump. Created with data from PRRI. (2017). 
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            Table 10. Views on Donald Trump. Created with data from PRRI. (2017). 
 
                 Figure 30. Feelings on Trump’s presidency. Created with data from PRRI. (2017). 
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                  Figure 31. Favorability of Donald Trump. Created with data from PRRI. (2017). 
 
In 2017 white evangelicals were also considerably more likely to believe President 
Trump was looking out for their interests than the general public. A majority of white 
evangelicals said Trump represented their interests “very well” or “somewhat well” at 72% (see 
figure 32). This was 35% higher than the general population which was 47% (see figure 32). 
This shows that white evangelicals believe that Trump has represented their interests since 
becoming the president and further supports the idea that white evangelicals supported Trump 
during the election because they believed he would look out for their core interests. 
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         Figure 32. How well does Trump look out for your interests. Created with data from PRRI. (2017). 
 
Following the election white evangelicals continued issues with race. White evangelicals 
were 14% less likely to associate Confederate monuments with racism than the general public 
(see figure 33).  Additionally, white evangelicals were more likely to say “Professional athletes 
should be required to stand during the national anthem at sporting events”; 81% of white 
evangelicals said they “completely agreed” or “Mostly agreed” compared to 59% of the general 
public who said the same (see figure 34). This issue is important to race because players kneeling 
during the national anthem was a direct response by athletes to police brutality against African 
Americans in the United States. These two data sets show that having empathy for racial 
minorities was still a struggle for white evangelicals after the 2016 election. White evangelicals 
were however only slightly more likely to be uncomfortable with immigrants who speak little to 
no English than the general population. Since Donald Trump has both supported people, who 
wanted to show their heritage through Confederate monuments and criticized athletes for 
standing this data shows that Donald Trump continues to be on the same page as white 
evangelicals regarding cultural issues. 
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The respondent views the Confederate flag as representing … 
   
Figure 33. Beliefs on the meaning of the Confederate flag. Created with data from PRRI. (2017). 
 
Figure 34. Opinions on non-English speaker immigrants and athletes protesting during the national 
anthem. Created with data from PRRI. (2017).  
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On the issue of the United States being a Christian nation following the election, white 
evangelicals were split on whether being American meant “Having a mix of different cultures 
and values from around the world” or “Having a culture grounded in Christian values” with the 
later only having a slight minority (see figure 35). While white evangelicals were split 74% said 
being American meant “Having a mix of different cultures and values from around the world”, 
24% more than white evangelicals (see figure 35). This indicates that while evangelicals are 
split, they are still much more likely to associate being American with Christian values than the 
general population. The earlier data showed that white evangelicals were very likely to identify 
the United States as having been a Christian nation. This data supports that and indicates that in 
2017 white evangelicals were more likely to associate a sense of national identity with Christian 
values. 
   Figure 35. What does it mean to be American. Created with data from PRRI. (2017). 
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Conclusions 
 In this thesis, the goal has been to understand the long-term political trends of white 
evangelicals and how their support for Donald Trump during and after the 2016 election fit into 
these trends. Donald Trump differed significantly from both Mitt Romney and John McCain in 
his approach to religion and his attacks on other people’s faith. Additionally, despite his lack of 
religious rhetoric, he was similarly popular to Ted Cruz. Understanding why white evangelicals 
preferred Trump despite his significant deviation from Republican norms comes down to policy. 
While Reagan used religious rhetoric to connect with white evangelicals, the primary reason that 
white evangelicals fell in with the Republican Party is due to their response to core evangelical 
issues.  As was discussed conservative white evangelicals are primarily a reactionary group. The 
issues that separate them from the general public are almost always in response to progressive 
change. Their development as a political force was a response to change in the 1960s. The 
growth of reproductive rights, feminism, gay rights, and mandatory integration of Christian 
schools were the foundation of white evangelical core political position. The Christian Right and 
leaders like Jerry Falwell helped to change evangelical opinion on these topics from relatively 
neutral to extremely oppositional. The data analyzed indicates that white evangelicals have 
continued to care about these issues. White evangelicals have remained consistent on abortion 
from 2010 to 2016 with a majority wanting abortion to be illegal in all or most cases and a 
majority in 2016 believing that it was morally wrong. The data also shows continuing issues with 
homosexuality which are consistent with the Christian Rights anti-gay agenda. 
 Since white evangelicals are reactionary, their goals are determined by America’s 
changing cultural and political climate. Due to this, new issues of concern have arisen because of 
changes in America since the 1970s. Today white evangelicals have new problems surrounding 
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race such as white Christian nationalism, Islamic extremism, and immigration. The data supports 
the idea that in recent years white evangelicals have become more anxious about their position. 
They are a declining population that is being replaced by non-religious young people and 
evangelicals of color.  
Along with fear over continuing decline they also felt that they were currently facing 
hardships because of their status as white Christians. As an orthodox group white evangelical are 
prone to thinking about the futures status of their group (Martí, 2019, p.2). They were more 
likely to be concerned about discrimination against whites and evangelicals. They were also 
more likely to believe diversity was at the expense of whites and were more dismissive of 
protests against discrimination. When it came to immigration data, both pre and post-election 
showed that white evangelicals were more concerned with removing and keeping out illegal 
immigrants than the regular population. Previous research shows that Islamic terrorism is a major 
concern for white evangelicals. Their cooler feelings toward Muslims demonstrates this concern. 
The demographic shifts that are occurring show a vision of the future that is less Christian and 
less white. White evangelicals do not like what the future will look like if these trends continue. 
White evangelicals wanted a candidate that would reassert the power and influence of their group 
on the American political system, and Trump fulfilled this desire (Martí, 2019, pp. 2-7).   
 As these new issues arose, white evangelicals were also experiencing changes within 
their group. The research by PRRI shows that between 2011 and 2016 white evangelicals began 
to care less about the personal morality of candidates and their religious views. This meant that 
going into the 2016 election white evangelicals were more focused on candidates whose policies 
matched their own goals than those who were more proficient at using religious rhetoric. Donald 
Trump was exactly what evangelicals wanted. Trump has failed to clearly condemn white 
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nationalists following the infamous Charlottesville rally where white nationalists protested the 
removal of a monument to Robert E. Lee during which they shouted Nazi chants. The following 
day a counter-protester was killed by a white supremacist driving his car into a crowd. In 
response to this President Trump evaded condemning the white nationalists saying, “you also 
had people that were very fine people on both sides” (Trump, 2017). He has made disparaging 
comments about the football player Colin Kaepernick who was protesting police brutality by 
kneeling during the national anthem and has constant issues when speaking about race 
(Desjardins, 2017; Graham, 2017). As discussed previously he has also been openly antagonistic 
toward both illegal immigrants and Muslims. Additionally, Trump has installed pro-life judges 
like Brett Kavanaugh to the Supreme Court (Stuart, 2018). While Trump has not reinstalled don’t 
ask don’t tell, he has banned transgender individuals from serving in the military and transgender 
individuals are part of the LGBT community along with gays and lesbians. His positions aligned 
with white evangelicals on almost all of their core issues. Their feelings toward his behavior did 
not outweigh their support for his policies. White evangelicals continued support following the 
2016 election and believe that Donald Trump is looking out for their interests shows that they are 
getting what they want out of a Trump presidency.  
 Despite the impact, Donald Trump has had on politics due to his divergence from 
accepted norms he has not damaged the strong relationship between the Republican Party and 
white evangelicals. Their continued support and their aligning political interests may have 
actually strengthened the relationship. Within the historical context of white evangelicals in 
politics, the results of the 2016 election and continuing support for Donald Trump are 
unsurprising. White evangelicals will support candidates who provide policies that match their 
core values. Trump has been able to do this effectively so he will continue to have their support. 
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Donald Trump is not a Republican whom white evangelicals have begrudgingly accepted but 
instead is in the words of Jerry Falwell Jr. “their dream president,” (Wadsworth, 2018).   
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APPENDIX A 
Description of surveys used 
The surveys used were the PRRI American Values Survey for the years 2010, 2011, 2012, 2014, 
2015, 2016, and 2017. Additionally, the PRRI Post-election American Values Surveys for 2012 
and 2014 and the “PRRI/The Atlantic 2016 Post-Election White Working-Class Survey” were 
also used. Data for the PRRI studies came from surveys conducted by phone by professional 
interviewers (PRRI About). 
The data for the PRRI 2010 American Values Survey was taken between September 1st to 
14st and included 3,013 respondents with 620 white evangelical respondents. The PRRI 2011 
American Values Survey was conducted from September 22 to October 2 and included 1,505 
respondents with 264 white evangelical respondents. The PRRI 2012 American Values Survey 
was conducted from September 13th to September 30th and included 3,003 respondents and 299 
white evangelical respondents. The PRRI 2014 American Values Survey was conducted from 
July 21 to August 15 and included 4,507 respondents and 812 white evangelical respondents. 
The PRRI 2015 American Values Survey was conducted from September 11 to October 4 and 
included 2,695 respondents with 337 white evangelical respondents. The PRRI 2016 American 
Values Survey was conducted from September 1st to 27th and included 2,010 respondents and 
245 white evangelical respondents. The PRRI 2017 American Values Survey was conducted 
from October 18th to 30th and included 2,019 respondents with 197 white evangelical 
respondents. For the post-election surveys the 2012 survey was conducted from November 7th to 
11th and had 1,410 participants, with 299 white evangelical respondents, the 2014 survey was 
conducted from November 5th to 9th and had 1,399 participants, with 284 white evangelical 
respondents, The “PRRI/The Atlantic 2016 Post-Election White Working-Class Survey” was 
123 
 
conducted between November 9th and 20th with 1,162 participants 37 of who were white 
evangelicals.       
From the Pew Research Center, the “2014 Pew Research Center’s American Trends 
Panel Wave 4”, the “2014 Pew Research Center’s American Trends Panel Wave 6”, the “2016 
Pew Research Center’s American Trends Panel Wave 18 June”, the “2016 Pew Research 
Center’s American Trends Panel Wave 20”, and the “2017 Pew Research Center’s American 
Trends Panel Wave 29”. The data from the Pew Research Center was also collected through 
phone interviews. “The typical Pew Research Center national survey selects a random digit 
sample of both landline and cellphone numbers in all 50 U.S. states and the District of 
Columbia” (Pew Research Center, Our survey). The numbers for interviews conducted through a 
landline, which account for about 25% of the total, are determined through “random digit 
dialing” (Pew Research Center, Our survey). Half of the interviewers asked for the youngest 
male in the household over the age of 18, and the other half asked the same but for a female 
respondent (Pew Research Center, Our survey). The interviews conducted by cellphone, which 
account for about 75%, were determined “through systematic sampling from dedicated wireless 
banks” (Pew Research Center, Our survey). For cellphone interviews, it was only asked if the cell 
owner was over the age of 18 to determine their eligibility (Pew Research Center, Our survey). 
Pew surveys have a typical margin of error around 2.9% which may vary based on the number of 
participants (Pew Research Center, Our survey). The data from the Pew Research Center is 
weighted. The landline responses are weighted based on household size, and both landline and 
cellphone data are weighted based on population parameters determined by the census (Pew 
Research Center, Our survey). 
 The final data for the “2014 Pew Research Center’s American Trends Panel Wave 4” 
was taken from May 30th to June 30th, 2014 and included 3,217 participants, with 439 white 
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evangelical respondents. The “2014 Pew Research Center’s American Trends Panel Wave 6” 
was conducted from August 11th through September 3rd, 2014 and had 3,278 participants, with 
78 white evangelical respondents. The “2016 Pew Research Center’s American Trends Panel 
Wave 18 June” was conducted between June 7 and July 5, 2016, and included 4,602 respondents, 
with 855 white evangelical respondents. The “2016 Pew Research Center’s American Trends 
Panel Wave 20” was conducted from August 16th to September 12th, 2016 and had 4,538 
respondents, with 849 white evangelical respondents. Finally, data from the “2017 Pew Research 
Center’s American Trends Panel Wave 29” was collected from September 14th to 28th, 2017 and 
had 4,867 total respondents, 862 white evangelical respondents.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
